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ABSTRACT
RICHMOND IRON: TREDEGAR'S ROLE IN SOUTHERN INDUSTRY DURING
THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
Lisa Hilleary
Old Dominion University, 2011
Director: Dr. Timothy J. Orr
The American South contained few iron industries in the decades before the Civil
War. Not until the Civil War did southern states produce significant quantities of vital
industrial products, such as iron. Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia, was a rare
exception. Under the ownership of Joseph R. Anderson, the company established a
national reputation for quality products. Prior to the war, Tredegar did business with
northerners and with the Federal government. During the war, Tredegar became one of
the main weapons suppliers to the Confederate military. Since this iron company
physically and economically survived the war, Anderson regained many of his
antebellum contracts. A few new iron industries appeared throughout the South during
Reconstruction, but they lacked the capital resources necessary for immediate success capital that Anderson had less trouble acquiring. Although Tredegar ultimately failed to
make the transition to steel, the company represented a route to industrialization not
experienced in other southern states, making Tredegar's experience, and thus Richmond's
experience, unique from other southern companies and cities.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Southern industry in the late 1830s did not exist in the same world as industry in
the North. For many southerners, industry held no intrinsic incentive, at least not enough
to tempt them awayfromagriculture. However, the increasing need to transport the raw
materials in the South contributed to the developing transportation revolution. Railroads
became more prevalent, and by the third decade of the nineteenth century, industry began
to flourish in Virginia. Small iron foundries cropped up throughout the commonwealth,
bringing an industrial component into its economy.
Several types of industry appeared. Cotton and tobacco processing mills began
producing small amounts of finished products from the raw materials of the region.
Textile mills provided cloth madefromthe processed cotton. These mills were not so
commercial as to offer competition to their northern counterparts, but they provided a
new means of revenue. The iron industry also appeared to meet the needs of expanding
railroads. Once Virginia established a market for iron products, iron foundries and iron
rolling mills emerged to take advantage of profits resultingfromthe presence of railroad
companies. Two of these companies, the Virginia Foundry Company and the Tredegar
Iron Company, merged to form a greater iron industry, taking the name Tredegar Iron
Works, located in Richmond, Virginia.
Under the leadership of its commercial agent turned owner, Joseph Reid
Anderson, the company became well established in Virginia and known to the rest of the

South. It was one of the largest iron industries in the South before the commencement of
the Civil War. Its size and its reputation for quality ensured its prominence during that
conflict. Tredegar survived the war and served as a barometer of success for an
industrializing southern city in the postwar period. The purpose of this study is to
illustrate how and why Tredegar continued to produce and briefly prosper after the war.
Tredegar helped to define Richmond, which was caught between the traditions of the
South and the progressive industry of the North.
Tredegar was unique to Richmond because it incorporated slave labor into the
iron industry and through the business acumen and salesmanship of Joseph Anderson, the
company survived and grew in the South during Reconstruction. Through Anderson's
ability to adapt to changing politics, Tredegar garnered and maintained support for its
continued production and presence in the city. Because of Tredegar's reputation as an
iron producer before the war, Anderson quickly regained his business associations with
northerners and with the Federal government, which gave the company an advantage
over infant southern industries. Anderson's use of slave labor before and during the war
provided him with support from Richmonders, and his efforts to rebuild the city won him
acclaim across the country. This study will examine how the economy, the politics, and
the industrial modernization present in Richmond between the 1830s and the 1870s
shaped Tredegar, explaining why the company became the exception within the existence
of limited and small southern industry.
Anderson was the key to Tredegar's success. He compromised his political
affiliations and principles to fit the needs of his company. The labor, location, and output
of Tredegar all contributed to its thriving in the antebellum and wartime eras, but it was
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Anderson who made the company unique. Eric Foner described Tredegar as being "the
exception" to the idea that southern industry did not succeed during Reconstruction.
Anderson himself represented this exception - as one of the youngest members of his
family, he was forced to make his own fortune, and he did so with great enthusiasm and
skill. His desire for a booming, successful business and a vast, individual fortune drove
Anderson to run Tredegar in ways other southern industrialists did not favor, such as
using politics for purely industrial ends and treating all workers equally on the factory
floor. Ultimately, while his politics remained fluid before and during the Civil War, his
refusal to move forward with technological progress led to a gradual decline for
Tredegar. His role at Tredegar demonstrated that the role of southern industry during
Reconstruction needs more attention and analysis.1
Tredegar's story, however, charted a unique experience, countering the argument
of the complete failure of southern industry during Reconstruction. Michael Chesson's
Richmond After the War concluded that industry all but failed during Reconstruction,
emphasizing Richmond's foibles in particular. The economic depression of the 1870s,
according to Eric Foner's Reconstruction, negatively affected the entire South, including
industry, stifling any slim progress made since the end of the war. According to Foner,
southern industry did not succeed during Reconstruction. Banks shut down, businesses
decreased output, and farmers suffered. Southern industry also felt its effects. There had

1

Charles Dew, lronmaker to the Confederacy: Joseph R Anderson and the Tredegar Iron Works
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 1-12; Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished
Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1988), 391.
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been a movement afoot to modernize the South, but the Panic of 1873 shut down that
process.2
The emphasis on southern industry during Reconstruction has only appeared
within the last four decades. During the early 20th century, historians of Reconstruction
focused on political and social history within the period. In 1907, William Dunning
published a volume entitled Reconstruction Political and Economic, 1865 -1877, in
which he stated that, "the North claims our principle attention" when addressing "the
social, economic, and political forces" of Reconstruction. Dunning made little mention
of the role of industry during this period, particularly in the South, where "the many
factories which had been developed, on however primitive a scale, to supply the needs of
the Confederate armies, were reduced to wreckage or ashes." Rather, Dunning
emphasized the "disorganization of the labor system" for his discussion on the southern
Reconstruction economy.3

2

Michael Chesson, Richmond After the War (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1981), xv; Foner,
Reconstruction, 535. For further reading on southern industry, see Harold Wilson's Confederate Industry
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2002). According to Wilson, several southern cities boasted
cotton processing mills, but few could count an iron producer. Montgomery Iron Works of Mobile,
Alabama and the East Tennessee Manufacturing Company had iron industries before the Civil War. Leeds
Foundry existed before the war, but produced cotton processing tools and products. Once the war
commenced, Leeds began producing arms for the Confederacy. The Atlanta Rolling Mill, created only a
few years before the war, also contributed to the armament of the Confederacy through the production of
iron for both weapons and plates for ships. During the war, the Leeds Foundry and the Atlanta Rolling Mill
helped arm the Confederacy, but Tredegar outranked it in both size and production. Other iron foundries
and rolling mills appeared during the war, such as Shelby Iron Works in Alabama and several smaller iron
works in the Spartanburg area of South Carolina. Harold Wilson's Confederate Industry examined cotton,
iron, and tobacco industries. He discussed Tredegar when addressing the iron industry in the South, stating
that the company experienced success from its wartime contributions. His view of Tredegar followed with
Warren Kimball's discussion in American City, Southern Place that Tredegar helped to revive the city of
Richmond after the war. The evidence in both suggests that while southern industry generally experienced
difficulties, Tredegar rebounded quickly and efficiently. Southern industry generally has been overlooked
in studies of Reconstruction. Only in the 1960s did historians even begin to note the importance and the
presence of southern industry during Reconstruction.
3
William Dunning, Reconstruction Political and Economic, 1865-1877, vol. 22, The American
Nation: A History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1907), xv-xvi, 12.

5
To Dunning, the period was one of oppressive Radical Republicans and the threat
of "negro rule." Historians including W.E.B. DuBois and Howard Beale rose up to
counter this interpretation, illustrating the significant role blacks played during
Reconstruction. Revisionists of the 1940s and 1950s altered the "Dunning school"
interpretation of Reconstruction, focusing on "social and political progress for blacks"
after the Civil War. Again, industry, and more notably southern industry, remained
hidden beneath the layers of political and social controversy.4
In 1951, C. Vann Woodward published his volume Origins of the New South,
1877-1913, discussing the importance of "regional history." A limited discussion of
industry appeared in this book, but the focus remained mainly on the North and the
North's role in building southern industry. Woodward stated that southern industry was
driven, along with northern intervention, by a "moral change of heart," in which
southerners' "will [and] ambition.. .had much to do with the speeding up of Southern
industrialization." He briefly touched on a few of the industries developing in the South,
and mentioned the iron industry, which he stated was "largely a hopeful potentiality"
before 1879, when northern and English businesses began investing in the South.
Tennessee, Virginia, and Alabama developed the most significant iron industries during
this period, but not until 1884, so Woodward claimed, did "Southern iron make its first
successful invasion of any extent into the Northeastern market." No mention of specific

4

Foner, Reconstruction, xx-xxi; Seth M. Scheiner, ed., Reconstruction: A Tragic Era (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1968), 13-7. According the Eric Foner, Howard Beale originally followed
the Dunning school, but began supporting the interpretation for which W.E.B. DuBois is credited. For
further reading, see DuBois's Black Reconstruction in America.
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industries appeared in this analysis because the role of industry remained significantly
undetected - a result of the political and social emphasis.5
Some changes to the focal points of Reconstruction occurred during the 1960s,
starting with historian John Hope Franklin. Although only one chapter in Reconstruction
After the Civil War discussed the role of industry, Franklin mentioned that "the ironworks
around Richmond began to surpass their prewar importance." The majority of the
economic discussion of the South emphasized agriculture, but the acknowledgement that
the iron industry around Richmond already existed and was improving, suggests that
some historians began to attribute more weight to its existence. Others, such as Harvey
Wish's edited book, kept their focus on the social experience of blacks and role of
political change in Reconstruction. By this point, most historians agreed that the
Dunning interpretation had run its course, and no longer assumed "carpetbaggers and
Southern white Republicans were wicked," nor that "Negroes were incompetent." These
changes laid the foundation for further revisions, including the incorporation of southern
industry in Reconstruction studies.6
It was in this decade that Charles Dewfirstpublished his book, Ironmaker to the
Confederacy. Although it had no introduction and no argument, Dew mentioned that he
wanted to expand Kathleen Brace's Virginia Iron Industry in the Slave Era to include a
more thorough analysis of Tredegar, since the company records had just been donated to
the Library of Virginia in 1958. Dew studied Tredegar, presenting a thorough history of
5

C. Vann Woodward, Origins ofthe New South, 1877-1913, vol. 9, A History of the South
(Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 113,126-7.
6
John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction After the Civil War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1961), 177; Harvey Wish, ed., Reconstruction in the South, 1865-1877: Firsthand Accounts of the
American Southland after the Civil War (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1965), xxxix; Herman
Belz, "The New Orthodoxy in Reconstruction Historiography," Reviews in American History 1, no. 1
(March 1973): 106-7..

an industry which "had a direct and significant impact on the history of the South and the
nation." He commented that the previous lack of evidence accounting for southern
industry left a hole in the discussion of Civil War and Reconstruction. He also explained
that no historian had previously examined Tredegar because historians continued to view
the effect of southern industry as minimal to the story of Reconstruction, and because the
company's records only became available to the public in 1958. With this book, Dew
helped to unravel some of the issues surrounding the role of Confederate industry. But,
even with the publication of this book, the Reconstruction literature remained focused on
the black experience and did little to incorporate the post-Dunning revisionism into the
newfound attention to Richmond's iron industry.
Around the same period some historians began publishing an increased number of
histories of Richmond. Most of the Richmond historiesfromthe 1960s and before
focused on the city, and did not emphasize any industrial aspects. In this vein, Michael
Chesson wrote Richmond After the War, which addressed the role of industry in a
specific southern city, in "the absence of a modern history of Richmond during the postCivil War era." Chesson referenced Dew's book, commenting on the role of Tredegar
within the city, and continued expanding on the role of other industries in Richmond.
The 1960s thus put forth some questions about southern industry which historians began
to address in the 1970s and 1980s.8
Chesson demonstrated the importance of industry in Richmond, stating that it was
mainly industry which determined Richmond's measured success during Reconstruction.
He discussed Tredegar specifically, using Dew's book as a reference, stating that
7
8

Dew, Ironmaker, xi-xii.
Chesson, Richmond, xvi.

8

"Richmond's ironworks was the only one that increased the value of its product from
1860 to 1870," showing a significant change in the interpretation of southern industry.
While industry in the South on the whole was not addressed, Chesson and Dew made the
point that Tredegar was a unique example in that it facilitated the social, political, and
economic reconstruction of Richmond. But for Chesson, Tredegar's example did not fit
the general trend. Through his research, he determined that Richmond did not reach its
full potential as a city, remaining "a miniature metropolis." He attributed this to the
complexity of politics in the city, Richmond's "reluctance to part with the past," and the
decline of the iron industry in the 1880s. The textile and printing industries grew, but the
iron industry had declined, harming Richmond's economy.9
New historians of Reconstruction continued to deal with Tredegar as Dew and
Chesson had done, by referring to it as an anomaly. Eric Foner approached
Reconstruction thematically, weaving industry into his discussion of politics and race. In
his view, few northern companies and investors wanted to risk investing in infant
southern enterprises. Through the evolution of change during Reconstruction, Foner
argued that southern society had to shift to accommodate the new relationships between
whites. Politics affected the socioeconomic parts of southern society, making it difficult
for both northerners and southerners to accept changes in their respective economies.
The likelihood of failure ran high during this period for southern industries. The
economy in the South after the Civil War did not offer a market necessary for new
industries. The costs outweighed the benefits, and entrance barriers to industry were
extremely high and competitive. But he softened the extremity of the situation when it
came to Tredegar, stating that northerners did invest, but only "to assist reviving prewar
9

Chesson, Richmond, 138-9,143, 164-5.

9
establishments like Richmond's Tredegar Iron Works." Tredegar, he stated, had
"attracted enough northern investment to resume production," but Anderson's company
was an exception.10
Foner's discussion of southern industry in general was limited, and when it
appeared, he dealt with cotton processing mills, not iron. By not investigating individual
industries in greater detail, Foner overlooked the contributions of Tredegar, namely that
the company illustrated the epitome of how the urban South should have developed
during Reconstruction.11 The company represented the outcome the South did not
achieve after the war. Tredegar became the epitome of what the North hoped to create in
the South, which explains Foner's exemption of the companyfromhis blatant statement
that industry did not succeed during the Reconstruction period.
Tredegar ought to have played a larger role in Foner's book, for it was a clear
example of Foner's discussion of the evolution of racial attitudes and the growing
connection between race and class. Anderson's management of his work force
demonstrated Foner's concept that southern whites wanted to retain control of labor. The
increasing desire for economic independence among Richmond's blacks threatened not
only the flow of production at Tredegar, but also affected the city's politics, particularly
during the Readjuster period. Had Foner studied Tredegar in more detail, he might have
1 "\

seen that the industry's significance could not be dismissed so easily.
Departing from Foner's cursory approach, historians of the late 1980s and 1990s
devoted more attention to the role of southern industry in Reconstruction. Using Dew's
10

Foner, Reconstruction, 213, 390-2.
Ibid., 379-92.
12
Ibid., 379-92.
13
Ibid., xvii-xxv, 535, 591-593; Perman, Political Unity, 151-6.
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10
book, Warren Kimball wrote a history of Richmond before the war, devoting a chapter
the role that Tredegar filled before and during the Civil War. Tredegar, according to
Kimball, affected the labor, politics, and economic conditions of antebellum Richmond.
He stated that Tredegar "was the city's only major business with a substantial market in
the American South," countering Woodward's statement that no significant antebellum
southern industry existed.14
Harold Wilson's Confederate Industry devoted his entire book to investigating
southern industry during and after the Civil War, and stated that "Tredegar Iron Works in
Virginia [was a] large and successful establishment." The emphasis on southern industry
as a part of Reconstruction illustrates both an increased recognition of the role of industry
in the rebuilding of the South and the greater accessibility to records and evidence on
southern industries. According to Wilson, southern industry had been growing in the
antebellum period, and needed to continue to grow during Reconstruction. He discussed
that the South had to increase its level of industry because "the poverty and deprivation
of the region could be cured only by economic development," since the war had been lost
due largely to the limited industry in the region. Wilson's focus on the role of industry in
the South demonstrated its growing importance to the histories of Reconstruction in the
late 20th century and early part of the 21 st century.15
Tredegar did not yield tremendous economic success, but its presence gave
Richmond a unique advantage, particularly after the war, when industry began to
dominate the national economy. With little industry, the South accounted for around ten
percent of the country's economy. Although Tredegar did not contribute significantly

14
15

Kimball, American City, 159-60.
Wilson, Confederate, xvi-xvii, 272-4.
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during the Reconstraction period, it put Richmond on the road to prosperity. No
argument can be made that Richmond surpassed the production and success of northern
cities, but through Tredegar, Richmond initiated a model for a successful iron industry in
the South.
To better unravel the importance of southern industry, this study will demonstrate
how Tredegar came to dominate the region before, during, and after the Civil War. No
research has been done on Tredegar during Reconstruction. Even Charles Dew's book
stopped in the late 1860s. Kimball and Wilson mentioned Tredegar, but only up to the
point of the immediate postwar period. Studying Tredegar during Reconstruction
provides a more definitive look at the business practice of Tredegar - going beyond its
antebellum and wartime success to witness its eventual decline by the late 1870s.
Since southern industry appears in Reconstraction worksfromthe past few
decades, most historians accept that it, along with politics and society, affected the ways
in which Reconstraction affected the nation. However, it remains vastly untouched, with
issues relating to southern agriculture holding center stage of books about
Reconstraction. Industry did, in fact, affect southern cities. To understand the ways it
did, historians must examine individual industries created or maintained after the war.
Tredegar is afineexample. It also held the advantage of having a forward-looking man
at its helm. Anderson devoted everything to the development of his industry,
compromising principles and politics to achieve greatness for Tredegar. When the
country began to change after the war, so too did Anderson change. As the country
reconstructed its political and economic views, industry in the South became more
apparent and more influential. For Tredegar, the sudden change in Anderson's character

12
- from a man of vision and progress to a man of conservatism and resistance to change led to the company's decline in the 1880s. While Tredegar provides an example of how
the South could have developed had it focused on industry, it also illustrates the
uniqueness of how Anderson approached industry.

13
CHAPTER II
RICHMOND'S "IRON KING" AND HIS COMPANY

Tredegar Iron Works, situated on the James River in Richmond, blossomed into
the leading southern iron industry during the middle of the 19 century. The company
developed within a region that employed slave labor, making the factory experience at
Tredegar unique from northern industries. The incentive of industrial slave labor,
combined with future owner Joseph Reid Anderson's business tenacity, created the
environment in which Tredegar thrived. Richmond Whigs supported this industry as part
of their platform calling for internal improvements. Naturally, Richmond's Democrats,
loyal to slave labor and agriculture, countered the Whigs' industrialism. Anderson's
political affiliations as a Whig influenced the way he managed Tredegar, emphasizing the
building of a local industry to support the economy. When the Whigs began to dissipate
in the 1850s, Anderson shifted his allegiance to the Democrats, using the slave labor at
Tredegar as the means for gaining their support. Anderson's political adaptation helped
Tredegar and its labor force to endure the precariously shifting political environment
through party realignment and war.
In the 1830s, Virginia experienced a railroad boom, initiating a need for iron
products. Throughout the decade, between ten and twenty iron foundries opened in the
state. The need for railroad materials ensured that a market for iron products would
remain in the city of Richmond. Richmond's location on the James River gave its iron
companies an advantage in transportation and steam power. In 1836, furnace operator
Francis Deane, Jr. acquired the financial investments necessary to start the Tredegar Iron

14
Company. The company took its namefroman iron works in Wales, the home of one of
the company's engineers.1
Around the same time, the Virginia Foundry Company formed, and it too
produced iron products, but its charter provided less capital than Tredegar. In 1837, the
two companies agreed to combine their foundries under a single manager. Tredegar,
being the larger entity, absorbed the Virginia Foundry Company, and with that, the
merger began producing rail materials. However, the panic of that year severely reduced
the railroad market to which Tredegar catered. By 1841, the company turned to Joseph
Anderson as its commercial agent to get the business affairs in order.
Anderson came from a large Episcopalian Scotch-Irish family in western
Virginia. As one of the youngest of the family, his father explained early on that Joseph
would have to make his own way because he would not receive an inheritance. With this
knowledge, Anderson decided he wanted to join the Army, and finally, after much
straggle, received an acceptance to West Point. He spent a little over a year in the army in
the Corps of Engineers, determining from his short experience that the military life was
not for him. He sought a civil engineering job, not the military engineering occupation to
which he had been assigned. After resigning and returning to his native Virginia, he
married, and then decided to take advantage of the unstable economic climate by taking
the helm of the straggling Tredegar.3
Anderson had become interested in industry while attending the Academy in New
York, noting that the "economic development of the state" gave it an advantage that

1

Charles Dew, Ironmaker to the Confederacy: Joseph R Anderson and the Tredegar Iron Works
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 1-4.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid., 1-4.
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Virginia lacked. Influenced by his time in the North, Anderson sought to build up
Virginia's economy, and found that opportunity at Tredegar, even though his familiarity
with the iron industry was minimal.4 He had been offered the position as Assistant State
Engineer for the Valley Turnpike project in Virginia, coming into contact with the
Tredegar owners at a commercial convention in Norfolk. Seeing his potential and his
charisma as a businessman and a salesman, the owners offered him a job as commercial
agent for Tredegar. Anderson knew next to nothing about iron production, but his
ambition for wealth and success served the company well during those early years.
Anderson became familiar with the layout of Tredegar, the foundry building being the
largest building on the site. He took the position, and by 1842, began the process of
setting up contracts with the Federal government, primarily taking contracts for the Navy
and the Army. His efforts suffered in 1843, when several of the cannon ordered by the
Navy Department failed to pass a test firing. The cannons were made of faulty materials,
and blew up when tested. Thus, early on, Tredegar suffered from a poor reputation.5
The failed products highlighted another problem within Tredegar: Anderson's
conflict with the board of directors for the company. In his opinion, gaining approval for
decisionsfromthe Board set back Tredegar's progress. Thus, in late 1843, Anderson
began leasing Tredegar, removing all powerfromthe Board of Directors. He reacquired
contracts with the Federal government, but now he produced iron with an improved
process using ironfromCloverdale and Grace - a company owned by his brother John and coal acquiredfrompits outside Richmond. Once he demonstrated the quality of

4
5

Dew, Ironmaker, 4-10.
Ibid., 1-12.

16
these altered iron products, Anderson produced hundreds of ordnance materials for the
Federal government.6
The increase in production could not have come at a better time. The 1840s
witnessed a boom in the business cycle. Still, the acquisition of Federal contracts served
as the true barometer of success, in Anderson's opinion. Following the Princeton
debacle, whereupon an experimental cannon blew up when lit, killing those around it, the
Ordnance Bureau petitioned fellow Virginian and President of the United States John
Tyler to find new sources of heavy artillery. Tyler, a booster for Richmond,
recommended Tredegar as a supplier of military-grade iron. Thus, in 1844, Tredegar
received a contract to build the steamship USS Polk. Tyler's reasons were influenced by
the faulty operation of cannon produced by a northern iron industry, for a northern
foundry had made the Princeton gun. This new vote of confidence from the Federal
government, along with the growing business contracts with men in the North and the
South, gave Tredegar an unprecedented reputation as the premier southern-based iron
industry. The Federal government went to Tredegar for "the best cannon," according to
the Richmond Enquirer. The New York Herald reprinted an article from the Enquirer,
which stated that Anderson epitomized "what Virginia enterprise and talent can achieve
when called out."
By the late 1850s, after Tredegar had received the contract for the Polk in 1844,
Secretary of War John Floyd required all cannon to be constructed under the Rodman
method, which produced stronger and larger guns by allowing iron castings to cool in a

6
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the South," Richmond Enquirer, 4 December 1856; "Southern Manufacturing Enterprise," New York
Herald, 13 July 1856.
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hollow core to relieve stress on the metal. Anderson refused to use the new method,
convinced that his method of iron production of casting in a solid tube had been working
well since Tredegar's 1843 incident. Starting late in the Tyler administration, the
Secretaries of War declared that all cannon sold to the Federal government must be
produced using the stronger Rodman process. Anderson refused to make the tranisition.
This refusal later affected the relationship between Tredegar and the Federal government
in the 1850s.8
While southerners generally abhorred tariffs and factory labor, Tredegar appealed
to the Whig party's platform for internal improvements, demanding higher tariffs to limit
foreign iron competitors. True to the national Whig Party platform, Anderson ardently
supported higher tariffs, and in 1848, he even went to Washington to offer his support for
a high tariff plan. The Walker Tariff posed a threat to Anderson, as it attempted to
reduce iron duties, pushing him to support "higher iron duties." Conversely, Democrats
in Richmond expressed concern over tariffs and the improvements of the Whig Party.
The Richmond Enquirer, a Democratic paper, urged citizens to prepare tofight"ultra
Whigs" who threatened the "progress [of the] nation."9
Richmonders tolerated industry at least as early as the 1830s, when the city
council, then dominated by Whigs, declared that "the prosperity of the city was deeply
involved" in its enterprises.10 However, Richmonders expressed caution due to concerns
that the city might "fall prey to the social disorder of northern cities."11 Anderson
8
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avoided Democratic criticism because he continued to use slaves at Tredegar; a decision
that ensured his industry would remain distinct from northern industries. Anderson
began using slave labor shortly after leasing the company, determining that to compete
with northern factories, he must cut labor costs. The difficulty of making Tredegar
amenable to southerners, and particularly, to the citizens of Richmond, relied on
Anderson's ability to defend factory labor to a diffident public. Through the use of slaves
at Tredegar, he had forged an industry that Richmonders could accept. Virginia
contributed less to the southern agricultural economy, since the state was not conducive
to raw cotton production (although numerous cotton processing mills existed in Virginia).
But by the 1840s, the rise of railroads in the state and the access to coal mines pushed the
entire state in a different economic direction from the rest of the South, acting as one of
the city's largest employers.12
Still, the use of slave labor caused Anderson tremendous difficulty. In 1847, a
strike occurred at Tredegar led by white workers who protested the use of slave labor.
Whig newspapers in the South defended Anderson's use of labor, slave and free, stating
that while the people understood the free workers' anger and frustration, they lacked the
right to dictate to their employer the type of labor that he could employ. One Whig
newspaper, supporting the use of immigrant workers, went further by stating that
Anderson's effort to remain firm against the strikers would "strengthen the feelings.. .to
immigrate to the slave States."13 Of course, The Liberator, an antislavery newspaper
from Boston, viewed the strike differently, using the incident as further evidence that free
and slave labor could not be combined, arguing that, "free men instinctively shun
12
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connection with... 'chattel' laborers.. .because it is degrading." Anderson dealt firmly
with the strikers, refusing to meet their demands and forcing the most recalcitrant ones to
leave. The results of this strike solidified him as a captain of industry. He now had a
sturdy cushion of slave labor should he need to replace any of his white workers.14
During the 1840s and 1850s, Anderson continued using slaves to supplement white labor.
Slaves mostly performed unskilled jobs at Tredegar, only gaining skilled positions
immediately before the war. This increasing use of skilled slave labor proved vital, as it
allowed Tredegar to continue production even when its white workers volunteered for the
Confederate Army.15
During the 1850s, Anderson began to appeal to southern state governors, calling
on them to purchase armsfromhis company. He tried to alter the opinion of the
Secretary of War, but Secretary Floyd remained adamant, informing Anderson that if he
did not produce using the Rodman method he would lose all contracts for cannon with
the Federal government. This loss of Federal revenue triggered Anderson's active pursuit
of southern clients. He began to encourage pro-Southern attitudes, and became
increasingly hostile to northern businesses because they had transitioned to the Rodman
process and had received several of the government contracts that Tredegar had sought.16
Anderson's participation as a member on the city council aided his efforts to
bolster Tredegar, illustrating his popularity among certain sectors of the city's population.
He encouraged a bill advocating the use of Virginia industries in the production of
14
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railroads and canals. In so doing, he maintained support for his presence on the council,
even though he did not hold a leadership position. He represented one of the five
Richmond voting wards, and often cultivated business relationships with members
representing the other wards. As he increased his political influence within Richmond,
the national Party with which he was affiliated began to falter in the 1850s.
The Whig Party in Richmond lacked the necessary cohesion to survive the Party
collapse of the 1850s. During the 1830s and 1840s, the Whigs divided regionally based
upon economic issues, and became more divisive in the 1850s with the conflict over
slavery. By the mid 1850s, Richmond Whigs had grown so factional that Anderson no
longer viewed the party as "able to protect southern interests," meaning slave labor. The
rise of the Republican Party pressured Anderson to accept that Virginia's Whig Party
could no longer hold out against the threat of antislavery.17
As Whigs dissipated in prominence in Richmond, even with the presence of
Tredegar, Anderson recognized his allegiance had to shift. His reliance on slave labor at
Tredegar assisted him in the transition, making him palatable to his former political
opponents. Whig newspapers accused him of betraying the party to accommodate his
"private interests," according to the Richmond Whig, but as an industrialist dependent on
slave labor, Anderson had strong reasons to become a Democrat. The Richmond Whig
criticized his political shift, stating that Anderson would receive "several fat contracts"
for moving to the Democratic Party. Evidently, Whig stalwarts viewed Anderson's
switch as a betrayal, and they concocted stories that impugned his business ethics to
make sense of it. By the mid 1850s, Anderson and other Richmond Democrats became

Dew, Ironmaker, 38-59; Untitled Article, Richmond Whig, 26 May 1857.
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the majority in Richmond's council, leaving the city's few remaining Whigs with no
political power.18
Anderson considered the Whig Party too weak to combat therisingRepublican
Party, so he therefore continued to push for internal improvements with Richmond
Democrats. Richmond Democrats also fought hard to defend slavery, and slaves
provided a large part of Tredegar's unskilled labor. After the collapse of the Whigs,
Anderson made an easy transition to the capital's dominant party. He did not need to
change Tredegar significantly, merely inspire loyalty to industry among fellow
Democrats. The Enquirer printed an article describing Anderson as "a gentleman of
great energy and business like habits," illustrating the civil respect Anderson earned
before he joined the Democratic Party.19
Richmond politics proved that slavery and industry could coexist successfully.
The acceptance of Tredegar became apparent in the Richmond Enquirer, where
acceptance of regulated banks preceded the toleration of industry. Further, during a
"Democratic Festival" in 1852, the Enquirer reported that "a crowd gathered...around
Mr. Grant's [tobacco] factory," showing the gradual acceptance of industry by Richmond
Democrats. The reported statementfroma New York Democrat stated that "slave
owners are as good and merciful as other men," illustrating that perhaps some northern
Democrats were more open-minded when considering slave labor in factories.20
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Thus it was by 1857, just as the Whig Party faded from existence in Virginia, the
Democratic Party emerged as a booster of southern industry. Tredegar's use of slave
labor helped reinforce Democratic loyalty to Anderson and his company. The iron
industry in Richmond offered a successful and unique example of employing slave labor
in the factory system. Tredegar did not threaten the existence of slavery, making it easier
to accept into the fold of the Democrats' platform of defending slavery.
The Panic of 1857 challenged Tredegar with a multi-year depression. At the
onset of the Civil War, several smaller southern railroads defaulted on their payments to
Tredegar, forcing the company to reduce production and take loansfromRichmond's
banks. Desperate for business, Anderson had to put up the company as collateral. The
limited Federal revenue also contributed to thefinancialstraits in which Anderson found
his company.21
Sales vacillated for Tredegar after Anderson's conversion to Democracy, but
continued to rise generally. The sale of weapons to the Army and the Navy helped
Tredegar to weather the economic crisis, even though the relationship with Floyd was
unstable. Anderson's refusal to transition prevented Tredegarfromsetting up contracts
through Floyd for arms, but Anderson still set up some contracts with the Army and the
Navy for other iron products, such as hardware and sheet iron, although the limited sales
appeared in the lower numbers in the table below.22
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Table 1. Tredegar Foundry Sales, January 1856 through December 1859.
1856

1857

1858

1859

January

$20,323

$2, 862

$2,476

$7, 735

February

$12,310

$5,263

$4,311

$4,183

March

$18,476

$8,041

$12,668

$12, 328

April

$5,000

$4,140

$19,767

$24, 045

May

$40,000

$15,851

$3,118

$12,902

June

$14, 067

$19,068

$11,781

$18,428

July

$31,450

$4, 765

$858

$35, 649

August

$24, 000

$28,008

$1, 802

$17,330

September

$3,423

$9,557

$2,011

$25, 815

October

$5,137

$7,157

$12, 756

$18,420

November

$27,681

$34, 838

$5,438

$16,111

December

$9, 212

$70, 542

$12,732

$11,548

Source: Data retrievedfromTredegar Sales Book for the Foundry, 1854-1860. Note: The portion from
1860 is in Table 3.

By 1860, Tredegar's sale of weapons increased substantially, particularly to individual
southern states. Anderson's campaign to encourage southern states to buy weapons from
Tredegar saved his company. Every state in the South purchasedfromTredegar, buying
rifles, cannons, shell, and shot, among other items. Of course, the southern states were
now preparing for war, as the secession crisis deepened with Lincoln's election.23
Although the above table illustrates that Tredegar sales fluctuated over the four year
23
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period (as with most companies), the average amount gradually increased into 1860, as
more individual states began purchasing armsfromthe firm.
By late December 1860, sales to railroads dropped significantly, as the demand
for war materials took precedence. On December 27,1860, Tredegar and the State of
Georgia (represented by General Paul Semmes) agreed to the issuance of shot, cannon,
and shells, which were required to meet the standards issued by the Army Ordnance
Department. In March 1861, a similar order was issued in a contract between Tredegar
•ye

and the State of Mississippi.
During the summer of 1860, the Charleston Navy Yard in South Carolina placed a
small order for iron plates and weapons. In December 1860, South Carolina and Georgia
began ordering weapons from Tredegar, fulfilling Anderson's goal of acquiring more
southern customers. Virginia and the City of Richmond also began purchasing earlier
that year as well. The war led Anderson to believe that Tredegar's "economic future
[lay] with an independent South."26
Ordersfromother southern states allowed Tredegar to remain intact throughout
the war. Tredegar became the major supplier of arms for the Confederate war effort. The
most difficult problem Tredegar faced involved the lack of raw materials, preventing
production levelsfromreaching their full potential. Contracts set up with the
Confederate government allowed Tredegar to continue, but not at full capacity, which is

24
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illustrated by the sales in Table 1.27 Due to the limited raw materials available, during the
war, Tredegar operated at only one third of its capacity.
Whatever their opinions before the war, after Virginia seceded, Richmonders held
Tredegar in high regard. On April 16,1861, Richmonders hoisted a Confederate flag
atop the "main building of the works," and the Smith Armory Band played "La
Marseillaise." Tredegar had been the first stop of a secession parade, and Anderson
delivered a speech, applauding the use of a Tredegar columbiad at Fort Sumter.
Governor Letcher attended as well, as reported by the Richmond Enquirer. This event
illustrated the importance of Tredegar to the new-found Confederacy. Already, Tredegar
had "one thousand kegs of powder and twenty thousand pounds of shot and shell"
delivered to South Carolina at the request of Governor Andrew Pickens. South Carolina
acquired these supplies, m addition to cannon and artillery guns.

South Carolina's use

for all these weapons and artillery from Tredegar is difficult to determine, but since the
state had been ordering since December, Governor Pickens possessed over $3,000 in
Tredegar-made artillery, gun carriages, and other weapons. Thus, southern purchases in
1860 - before the war broke out - kept Tredegar afloat.
On August 3,1861, Tredegar signed a contract with the Confederate States of
America (represented by the Confederate Secretary of War) for shells, guns,rifles,and
cannons.

In 1862, the Confederate States government agreed that Tredegar would be

allowed any scrap metalfromthe Baltimore and Ohio Railroad - after the Confederate
27
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26
army destroyed it to keep it out of Union hands - allowing Tredegar more access to raw
iron. By late 1862, Anderson set up contracts with the Confederate Navy Department
for iron, pig metal, and engines. Similar contracts continued for the duration of the war.30
Thefigurebelow depicts the number of sales Tredegar conducted with each state
over the course of the Civil War.

Figure 1. Number of Tredegar Sales to southern States, 1861-65.
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Source: Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1860-67. Note: Only numbers for the "State of Virginia are listed,
although there were other purchases listed separately under the "Commonwealth of Virginia."

As this chart illustrates, most Confederate states purchasedfromTredegar at least fifteen
times over the course of the war. Most purchases averaged in the same range of a few

30.
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thousand dollars, but the Confederate government purchased far more and at a higher
frequencyfromTredegar.
Most individual sales averaged at approximately $1,000, mainly in cannon, shot
and shell, and guns and gun carriages. On average, each individual order contained
around 50 cannon, hundreds of shot and shells, and 100 gun carriages. Some of the
orders were more extravagant, such as the March order from South Carolina, and the two
separate purchases by Georgia in March and April of 1861, together totaling over
$10,000. Virginia and North Carolina followed Georgia and South Carolina, with few
extraordinarily large buys, but those two states consistently purchased from Tredegar
throughout the war. Louisiana and Tennessee did not purchase often because each had
local iron industriesfromwhich they bought weapons and artillery. Alabama, with a
narrow coast line, had little need to purchase iron productsfromTredegar (smaller
coastal defenses), and only bought three times throughout the war.32
The Confederate government lacked strong central authority early in the war,
which Jefferson Davis realized after becoming thefirstConfederate president, explaining
the individual state purchases in addition to Confederate purchases. Figure 2 shows the
amount of purchases made by Confederate government entities.

31
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Figure 2. Number of Foundry Sales to Confederate Organizations, 1861-65.
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The Confederate Navy purchased materials for constructing ships, and the sales book
clerk noted the building of a "Submarine Boat." The high amount of purchasesfromthe
Confederate government depicted here resultedfromcombining all Confederate entities
and branches into the category, as the book listed numerous smaller departments.
Excluded are the Navy Department, the Armory Extension and the Engineer Department,
which merited significant purchases separatefromthe other branches of the
government.33
Purchasesfromthe Confederate entities reached a similar range, usually doubling
the amount of an average state purchase (about $2,000). The sales book most often listed

Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1860-67.
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the "Confederate States of America," and occasionally specified a specific branch, such
as the military store, the railroad bureau, or the laboratory, which explains the high level
of purchases in Figure 2. The Spike Factory and Forge Repairs purchased far less,
averaging $600, but sometimes reaching $1,000 in their orders for iron. The smaller
amount can be attributed to the fact that these two departments did not purchase weapons
or artillery.34
An article in the Richmond Enquirer in December 1862 illustrated the concerted
effort of factory owners, including Anderson, to acquire and keep labor for production - a
problem that plagued Tredegar until the end of the war. A record of the precise number
of workers who left to join the army, or who were drafted into it, was not kept by the
company, but the increased use of slaves at Tredegar attests to the limited number of
white workers available.
Table 2 below exhibits the value of Tredegar's wartime sales, with the exception
of October through December 1864.

34
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Table 2. Tredegar Foundry Sales, January 1860 through September 1864.
1860

1861

1862

1863

1864

January

$5, 842

$21,329

$79, 716

$108,938

$260, 870

February

$17, 549

$33,018

$57, 304

$120,437

$317, 504

March

$17,312

$45,102

$51,332

$176,972

$371,221

April

$25,754

$67,094

$97,422

$139,276

$310,959

May

$26,387

$71, 542

$89, 500

$92,546

$363, 340

June

$59,233

$68, 759

$62,939

$42,973

$485,646

July

$7, 509

$72, 574

$52, 570

$139, 587

$512,273

August

$40,202

$86, 079

$90,363

$144,035

$335, 443

September

$41,984

$95,152

$76,019

$170, 888

$350, 000

October

$18,836

$73, 207

$89,652

$213, 343

—

November

$27,943

$90,766

$123,484

$195, 882

—

December

$61, 807

$79,251

$156,344

$264, 120

—

Source: Tredegar Sales Book, Foundry October 1860 - September 1867. Note: The RecordsfromOctober
1864 through September 1867 became Salesfromthe Rolling Mill, not the Foundry. Additionally, January
through September 1860 were retrievedfromthe previous Sales Book, 1854-1860.

Noticeable spikes appeared between October and November of 1862, as inflation took its
toll on the southern economy. Sales hit an all time high in July 1864, reaching $512,000,
but this reflected the Confederacy's 700 percent inflation rate.36
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Tredegar continued to operate below its capacity throughout the war because it
used all of the available iron ore deposits, and did not have access to any other raw iron.
This prevented the companyfromproducing large quantities of any item. Additionally,
while Anderson had updated equipment at Tredegar, he had still not updated to the
Rodman process for producing cannon. While this decision cut costs, it prevented
Tredegarfromconstructing stronger types of cannon.
Regardless, the presence of Anderson at Tredegar was crucial to remain
producing war materials. At the onset of the war, Anderson was designated a brigadier
general, but after less than a year, he resigned his commission after being wounded
Fraser's Farm. The reasons for Anderson's direct involvement with the Confederate
Army remain unclear, but he immediately returned to Tredegar to resume his duties.
Some of the managers left in charge failed to live up Anderson's production standards,
which he discovered as army officers began complaining of the poor quality of Tredegar
products. The Confederate War Department needed Anderson to return to Tredegar to
ensure the cannon and other arms would be reliable, as the managers left in charge failed
TO

to successfully run Tredegar in his absence.
The lack of skilled labor also became worse when the Confederate draft went into
effect. Anderson increased the number of slaves in skilled positions, but he also had to
turn to immigrant labor, which he disliked. Still, it took too long to retrain new
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employees, especially those new to the English language. This, combined with the dearth
of raw iron, contributed to the weakening of Tredegar's war effort.
Before the war ended, some southerners suggested that the war was lost, and
rallying afinalcampaign would be useless. This sense of foreboding suggested that
some southerners began preparing for a Union victory before the war ended. This
sentiment was particularly visible to industrialists such as Anderson, who had begun to
see a decline in production and profits prior to the surrender of Confederate armies.
Likewise, Samuel Collins, a southern financial advisor, sent word to his employer in
February 1865 the details of acquiring currency from several state banks. Along with this
letter, Collins included some "confidential" correspondence, reiterating that what
followed was only his "opinion," which "should be taken with allowance."40
Collins's opinion discussed how the war and the Confederacy fared. The point he
sought to illustrate stated that he would not recommend investing in any southern state
currency or bonds, as he "believefd] our cause is hopeless and irretrievably gone." If
events continued on the same course, he wrote that he "can't see how Lee can hold
Richmond and provision his army." He continued his letter, adding that some men of his
acquaintance believed the South "will whip them [the Union army] yet," but he stated
that those men have not "explain[ed] to [his] satisfaction how all this must or can be
done."41 This further illustrated the low production at Tredegar during the war, which
would set the tone for his determined push to start the rolling mill and foundry at
Tredegar immediately after the war.
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This acceptance of the North's victory permeated portions of the South in 1865,
with Sherman having reached the Atlantic in December 1864, and with Grant hovering
closely outside of the Confederate capital. As Collins's letter described, not all
southerners considered the probability of a Union victory, but some had already begun to
grow accustomed to a southern defeat. After the destruction of Richmond by fire and
with the occupation by the Union army, the city began the process of rebuilding in
1865.42
Despite the political and economic changes and the conflicts within the labor
force, Tredegar survived the economic panics and the war through Anderson's business
acumen and salesmanship, and through his connections to the government and northern
and southern businesses. He managed to keep a supply of raw materials and credit during
roughfinancialperiods. When the supportive Whig party declined, Anderson switched to
the Democratic Party to ensure the survival and protection of Tredegar. With these
precedents and the reputation and contracts enacted before the war, the company pulled
through, also managing to escape significant damage or destruction by Confederate or
Union forces. Under these circumstances, Tredegar survived the war.
Anderson appealed to the citizens of Richmond because he was one of their own.
According to the Richmond Dispatch, Tredegar represented a "worthy specimen of what
can be done.. .through the skill and enterprise of our own citizens." He helped Tredegar
out of thefinancialdistress incurred during the 1837 panic, and continued to do whatever
was necessary to ensure Tredegar's survival during the Panic of 1857. He used every
resource and raw material available to keep production going, which contributed the
increasing strength of Tredegar. These events helped prepare Anderson for the difficult
42
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production period during the Civil War. In turn, his company's prewar and wartime
experience ensured Tredegar's success in the postwar period, the subject of the next
chapter.43
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CHAPTER III
RECONSTRUCTING TREDEGAR AFTER THE WAR

By the time the Civil War ended in 1865, the Southern economy had been
decimated. Much of the war had been fought in the South, and once Union troops began
occupying the region, railroads and other industries were destroyed to disrupt the
Confederate war effort. Richmond experienced severe inflation, only further contributing
to the effects of economic collapse in the Old Dominion. Even with the presence of the
iron company, Richmond encountered tremendous hardship during the road to recovery.
Tredegar, while suffering the negative effects of the war, succeeded in recovering
production levels and increasing the size and prosperity of the company. Anderson
posted guards outside of Tredegar, deterring those intent on burning Richmond from
setting fire to Tredegar. The company was one of the few buildings to remain standing at
the end of the war, managing to escape the wrath of Union forces occupying the city and
the wrath of Confederate forces who burned the city upon evacuation. Anderson faced
the difficulty of regaining the company's reputation and capital, both heavily damaged by
the war. Once Tredegar was able to produce at full capacity, it regained its hard-earned
investmentsfromimmediately prior to the war, reacquiring government contracts. Labor
strife persisted at Tredegar, as free and slave labor tensions disappeared only to be
replaced by racial tensions, but Anderson managed to diffuse these issues as they
surfaced. The combination of these factors brought Tredegar back to its prewar status as
a significant iron producer for both the South and the country into the early 1870s.
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Of the 5,000 industries listed in Virginia in the 1870 census report, approximately
ninety of them produced some type of iron product. Additionally, twenty-eight industries
were listed as "machinery," contributing to the railroad and boiler parts needed in the
railroad industry. Although Virginia accounts for few of the number of industries in the
United States as of 1870, it still accounted for more than any former Confederate state.
The survival of Tredegar acted as a testament to the gradual rise in industry appearing in
the South during the Reconstruction period.1

Table 3. Number of Industries by State according to the 1870 Census.
Richmond
Virginia
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Delaware
DC
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

Number of Industries
17 Missouri
5,933 Montana
Nebraska
2,188 Nevada
1,079 New Hampshire
3,984 New Jersey
5,128 New York
800 North Carolina
952 Ohio
3,836 Oregon
12,507 Pennsylvania
11,847 Rhode Island
6,566 South Carolina
1,477 Tennessee
5,300 Texas
2,557 Utah
5,550 Vermont
5,812 West Virginia
13,212 Washington
2,455 Wisconsin
2,270
1,731 United States

Number of Industries
11,871
201
670
330
3,342
6,636
36,206
3,642
22,773
969
37,206
1,830
1,584
5,317
2,399
533
3,270
2,444
269
7,013
250, 883

Source: The 1870 U.S. Census Report on Statistics of Wealth and Industry in the United States.
1

U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Ninth Census: 1870 (Washington: GPO, 1870).
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While Richmond reportedly had seventeen industries within its city limits, the industries
there invested and accounted for much more capital than other iron industries in southern
cities, and among these seventeen industries, Tredegar accounted for more than 50
•j

percent of the capital.
Richmond survived the war, but its experience was unique. Tension between the
Confederate government's presence and the local government's attempt to control the
city resulted in problems of crime, food shortages, and blurred lines of power and control.
The people of Richmond became bitter when the Confederate government took
precedence over the city. This bitterness became pronounced during the Richmond
Bread Riots in 1863, when men and womenfromRichmond and the surrounding counties
marched to demand lower food prices - an event that escalated into a mob scene with
violence and looting.
As Richmond had been the capital of the Confederacy, many southerners flocked
to itfromdifferent regions, commenting that they had come tofight"Virginia's battles" a phrase that embittered Richmonders toward the refugees. The urban population forced
a blending of different regional cultures - rangersfromTexas, Arkansas and Missouri
frontiersmen, Georgia and Louisiana troops, and South Carolinian elites - from all over
the South. While these people added to the labor force of Tredegar and its diversity, it
changed the shape of Richmond, and affected the mentality of Richmonders after the war
because the experience lent them exposure to the presence of people from different

2
3
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regions of the country, and would help during the city's occupation by the military after
the war. The familiarity did not suggest acceptance though.4
However, there was no general, overarching effect on the citizens of Richmond.
Each economic class suffered different maladies; therichfroma lowered supply of
goods, the poorfroma lack of money to buy goods. Progressively, throughout the war,
Confederate support waned in Richmond. Another factor separating Richmond from
other southern cities after the war was desertion by the Army of Northern Virginia. As
the Union troops approached the city, the Confederate troopsfled,burning much of it in
their wake, just as Charleston and Atlanta had been decimated by the war.5
Richmond looked physically different after the war. The Richmond Whig
estimated that about one thousand buildings had been burned, spreadingfromthe
explosion of the Confederate arsenal and the changing winds. Anderson requested and
received the Confederate government's reassurance that Tredegar would not be burned.6
Just to be sure, Anderson stationed workers outside of Tredegar, arming them with guns
and giving them orders to shoot any looters or miscreants approaching the company.
Once the fear of looting had subsided, Anderson still faced the imposing Union army,
which occupied the city on April 4,1865. Other southern cities had been occupied for a
majority of the war, so any wartime industry which had developed there had been
destroyed. Union troops entering Richmond sought to put out the fires, rather than start
them. General Weitzel, one of the Union's commanders, stated that he wanted to return
the city to peace and order. Union troops even helped to rebuild the city after the
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devastating fires. With its contributions to the Federal government before the war, some
Union officers understood the benefit of keeping Tredegar, rather than destroying it.7
Thus, Union troops occupied Tredegar after the capture of Richmond, forcing
Anderson to forfeit his company. For four months, Anderson worked diligently to regain
control of Tredegar. Lincoln's December 1863 Proclamation of Amnesty introduced the
"ten percent plan," under which former Confederates would be pardoned who agreed to a
loyalty oath to the United States and to the abolition of slavery. If ten percent of a
southern state's population did this, the state could be readmitted into the Union, with
those who had declared their oath appointed to the state's government. Some high
ranking civil and military Confederates were excludedfromparticipating, Anderson
among them. However, a small group of high ranking Richmond civil officials
(including Anderson) met with Lincoln before the end of the war, to hash out a plan to
end thefightingin Virginia. On April 4,1865, Anderson and some other prominent men
from Richmond had interviews with Lincoln and some of his advisors, and tried to set up
a legislature for after the war. Lincoln's plan would have made Anderson's readmission
easier, allowing him to regain control of Tredegar with less difficulty.8
After Lincoln's assassination, President Andrew Johnson's readmission policies
were stricter, at least in theory - a part of his attempt to punish southern planters.
Anderson applied for a special presidential pardonfromJohnson because he had been a
West Point graduate, served in the Confederate army, and "owned taxable property worth
over $20,000," all provisions which prevented himfromgetting a pardon. Few
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southerners excluded under these statutes were willing to declare allegiance to the Union.
Anderson, however, did not share in that reluctance, and he saw an opportunity to get
Tredegar back to prewar production levels. He hired a lawyer to help argue his case, and
he gained support from prominent Unionists including Governor Edwards Pierpont, Sr.,
who was appointed by the Federal government to the position after the war. The
governor, along with General Henry W. Halleck, argued that Anderson must regain
ownership of Tredegar because he would enable the Reconstruction government to "meet
the needs... [of] employment and reconstruction." The request was denied by Secretary
of War Edwin Stanton, who did not want Anderson to reacquire his company too easily.
Stanton put Tredegar under the control of Federal marshals, but Anderson did not relent.
He prepared a new petition later that year, now acquiring the support of railroad
presidents, who proclaimed their desire to see Tredegar once again run by Anderson.9
This time, Johnson denied Anderson's bid, as he did not trust men with property
over $20,000. Again, Anderson pushed to get his way. With a letter from the governor,
to whom Anderson had declared his loyalty, he met privately with the President to state
his case. By this point, Johnson unexpectedly relaxed his strict pardon policy. After the
summer in 1865, Johnson abandoned his strict pardon policy, granting amnesty to most
southerners who applied. Eric Foner suggested in Reconstruction that it could have been
a result of Johnson's prejudices, which had increased from "unexpected militancy"
among blacks, or perhaps to gain the support of southerners before his second bid for the
White House. By September, as Foner wrote, "Johnson had sufficiently satiated his
desire to humble the southern aristocrats." Regardless, by October 1865, Anderson had
acquired his long sought after pardon, but when he reclaimed his business, he then had to
9
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deal with the repayment of Tredegar's wartime debts, and reestablishing its prewar
contacts, particularly those in the North.10
Tredegar started producing iron goods almost immediately after Anderson
acquired his pardon. The company continued along, attempting to exist and prosper in
the struggling city, while continually looking for new markets of raw materials. The
raihoad industry gathered momentum throughout the country, giving Tredegar a lucrative
market in which to sell iron products, reverting back to its prewar customers. Some
southern railroads began to lay tracks, but often they were supported by northern
companies. One of the major problems for the South after the war involved the lack of
credit and capital. Through his contacts in the North, Anderson established credit with
some northern businesses to get Tredegar back on its feet. The prospects Anderson
actively sought in the North did not return prewar dividends, so to supplement business,
he began appealing to southern businesses, namely southern railroad companies. The
South, however, had little capital to invest in any business, and usually received most of
their capital from northerners. With the capital that he did acquire, Anderson gradually
increased Tredegar's production, and the company's prominence in Richmond.11
Since Tredegar survived the Civil War when most other southern industries did
not, Anderson held a significant advantage over those in the South who not only needed
to gain pardons from the Federal government, but they also had to rebuild their
demolished industries. Tredegar remained intact, and Anderson's efforts came to fruition
by 1867. Sales from January 1865 through December 1867 illustrated that the company
did not founder, even though they had yet to reach their prewar numbers. The sales

10
11

Dew, Ironmaker, 294-302; Foner Reconstruction, 187-91.
Dew, Ironmaker, 303-313.

42

amounts in dollars decreased tremendously between 1865 and 1866, due both to the
19

decline in demand of war materials and the return to federal currency.
In the table below, the sales listed in the Tredegar Foundry's sales book
demonstrate that Tredegar continued to produce iron wares during the postwar period.
There was a four month gap, between April and July of 1865, when Tredegar existed
under Federal control, but otherwise, the numbers compared with antebellum sales, and
taking into account both inflation over time and growth of the industry.
Table 4. Tredegar Foundry Sales by Month, 1865-67.
'

1865

1866

1867

January

$445,623

$28, 755

$6, 732

February

$594,000

$17, 722

$9, 505

$1,114,671

$14, 092

$20, 542

April

—

$18,961

$15,831

May

—

$20, 337

$16,511

June

—

$18,026

$13,712

July

—

$11,150

$27,136

$3, 577

$10, 808

$59, 560

September

$15, 725

$11,883

$53,755

October

$4, 258

$15, 086

$29, 953

$18,267

$9, 047

$32, 624

$17, 408

$21, 396

$68, 751

March

; August

November
December

:

Source: Data retrievedfromTredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-72. April through July of 1865 did not
have entries, and the clerk listed no notations referring to those months. Most likely, there were few to no
sales during the period immediately after the surrender at Appomattox, which would explain this gap in
record.
12
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Some products were produced during the four month gap under the supervision of the
government, continuing into August and September. By August 1865, Tredegar began
selling products again. In October, Anderson regained control of the company,
accounting for the jump in sales between October and November 1865. In the sales
book, "the United States" made hardware purchasesfromTredegar for a two month total
of $6,256. Likewise, the State of Virginia purchased similar items, along with railroad
1%

materials. Thefiguresby 1867 returned to the prewar equivalents.
The bulk of buyers during these years were railroadsfromall parts of the country.
Southern railroads purchased the most, as Tredegar was the most convenient supplier of
iron products for railroads. Northern raihoad companies had greater access to raw
materials, labor, and cheaper supplies. This did not prevent Andersonfromworking his
way up the East coast though. The customers listed in the sales book illustrated the
expansion Anderson sought for Tredegar. During this period, he sold to suchfirmsas the
New York Coal Company and the Union Manufacturing Company. Local institutions
also contributed to the clientele. The Richmond Gas Works, the Virginia Penitentiary,
and the James River and Kanawha Canal Company took advantage of the iron from
Tredegar to rebuild and improve their companies, spending thousands on building
supplies. Local railroads, such as the Virginia and Tennessee, the Southside, the
Richmond and Petersburg, and the Southern Railroad Association also purchased from
Tredegar.14
The company sold to non railroad companies as well. Richmond Gas Works
became one of Tredegar's most loyal customers both during and after the war. In the
13
14
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postwar period, the Gas Works purchased at least once a month, usually buying
hardware, pipes, and sheet metal. The Virginia Penitentiary also made several purchases,
usually for the upkeep of the building. Among some of the others were the Southern
Fertilizing Company, the Woolen Mill Factory, the Virginia Porcelain Company, and the
Virginia Fire and Marine Insurance Company. By 1870, the Virginia Steamship
Company began purchasing materials for the construction of ships. Tredegar sold large
orders these years to the nearby Tuckahoe mine. Some of the heaviest purchases though
came from companies and extensions of Tredegar.15
The Spike Factory and the Forge Factory bought heavilyfromTredegar before,
during, and after the war. In the immediate postwar period, the Rail Mill Repairs and
Construction Mill, the Bar and Chair Mill, the Eight-Inch Mill, and the Ten-Inch Mill
appeared in the sales book repeated starting in 1866. By 1869, a good portion of the
products sold went to these entities. The table below shows the sales from 1869 through
1872, when sales began to pick up tremendously and more companies purchased from
Tredegar.

15

Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-72.

Table 5. SalesfromTredegar Foundry by Month, 1869-72.
1869

1870

1871

1872

January

$3,981

$20, 407

$18,953

$69, 917

February

$13,069

$31, 130

$13,003

$96, 650

March

$40, 885

$14, 477

$34,925

$76,400

April

$27, 817

$40, 207

$46, 780

$81, 594

May

$5,318

$11,495

$92, 691

$87,258

June

$9,239

$61,229

$79,311

$94, 590

July

$5, 844

$40,247

$79, 510

$52, 986

August

$34, 760

$69,154

$33, 544

$75,076

September

$11,465

$79, 221

$44, 329

$110,628

October

$10,194

$32, 220

$146,437

$70, 825

November

$4,683

$69,638

$70, 697

$87, 050

December

$40, 856

$89,165

$133, 601

$143,316

Source: Data retrieved from the Tredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-72.

Although the sales vacillated each month, never constantly increasing, the totals for the
year show the growth of Tredegar as the 1860s came to a close. Some of the months
appeared extraordinarily low in comparison to the months before and after. But
purchases still appeared; often though, sales to companies consisted of lower priced
items, usually hardware. Tredegar went through some rough periods in trying to attract
investors immediately after the war, since many northern businesses were reluctant to
invest in the South. Anderson had to prove Tredegar was worth the investment, and so
had to begin producing at a low level of output to encourage investment. By 1869,
Tredegar began heavy construction to the Foundry and the surrounding mills and
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factories. Between 1869 and 1872, thousands of dollars in sales were listed as "Tredegar
Construction," with the name appearing over 50 times. Many of the materials were sheet
iron and hardware, although the sale of wheels became more significant by 1870.16
At the end of each month's sales report, the clerk counted the number of wheels
sold in that month, illustrating the importance of the product, especially with the
constantly increasing railroad industry in the area. The table below depicts the amount of
wheels sold each month, representing the gradual increase in both production and sales.

Table 6. Number of Wheels Sold at Tredegar from the Foundry, 1870-72.

January

—

301

1203

February

467

317

1606

135

415

1147

563

600

1256

May

143

1027

628

June

658

728

1054

; July

342

945

948

August

769

708

626

September

882

503

1633

October

396

1972

946

November

904

1634

955

December

904

1467

1072

Total for Year

6163

10617

13074

I March
April

1

i

Source: Data retrievedfromTredegar Foundry Sales Book, 1865-72. The data for January was not listed, and therefore
does not contribute to the total for 1870, although it more than likely will still put the total below that of 1871 and
1872.
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There was not a distinct pattern of increase among the number of wheels sold per month,
but overall, the yearly total of wheels sold showed that Tredegar sales for that particular
raihoad item increased, up to the year before the 1873financialcrisis.17
As the rebuilding of the South continued, Anderson's focus broadened from
regaining control of production and reaching prewar levels of production to expanding
the iron works through land acquisition. Much of the private correspondence from
Anderson around 1867 emphasized his drive to expand Tredegar. Additionally,
Anderson mentioned his continuance of farming on a plot of land he owned in the nearby
region, suggesting he did not merely depend on industry during the postwar period, but
also kept this investment in land. He hired some laborers to run and work his land.
Much of the South returned to agriculture after the war, and Anderson proved no
different. Any participation in farming came second to Anderson's focus on expanding
his company.18
The success of Tredegar partially relied upon the ability of its owner to maintain a
market for its products. Tredegar's advantage resided in Anderson's prewar business
connections which he reinstituted after the war. The Dover Company, a coal producer in
New York, ranked among of the most sought-after firms in Anderson's 1867
correspondence. The sales bookfromthe same year corroborated the prominence of
Dover through the amount of purchases from Tredegar. Between 1865 and 1872, Dover
Company purchased more than 70 ordersfromTredegar, averaging almost an order per
month, buying iron for machinery to mine coal. Anderson's awareness of the Dover
17
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Company's consistency appeared in several letters during the period between 1865 and
1872, especially with the need to purchase coal, in which he mentioned "the progress at
Dover" was something to admire and continue to follow, as they were an important
customer.
Shrewdly, Anderson used his tight association with the Dover Company to broker
new clients. In 1867, he forthrightly inquired as to Dover Company's relationship with
the James River and Kanawha Canal Company of Richmond. Thomas Ellis, a business
associate to Anderson and a representative of the James Riverfirm,wrote Anderson some
details regarding recent negations for a loan of $25,000fromthe Dover Company.
During the meeting, the Dover representatives made it clear they did not approve of the
investment in the James River Company, because it lacked the prestige. The Dover
representatives approved the investment because they respected Anderson, but in
dispensing this loan, they mentioned that they could "make a dozen far more desirable
investments, some of which [they] mentioned by name." While the relationship between
Dover and Tredegar did not change Tredegar's southern investments, it did prove that
Tredegar had re-established open and honest business with northern industries. It also
demonstrated the significant grip northern businesses had within the South through the
issuance of capital.20
Even U.S. army officers exhibited little reluctance to invest in Tredegar. One
army colonel requested shares, and on March 30,1868, Anderson replied that he "was
willing to let [him] have shares enough...to pay [him] the balance [he owed] in land."
Anderson further emphasized the need to expand Tredegar in a letter where he stated he
19
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had "not offered the stock to anyone in Virginia," illustrating both Tredegar's
prominence among non-Virginians and the company's dependence on northern capital.
The capital Anderson needed camefromnorthern businesses. Despite the initial
reluctance of a few northern businesses, Tredegar managed to stimulate its own growth
and gain interregional attention, largely due to Anderson's savvy business sense, which
allowed to bend his personal morals and political convictions to achieve his goals for
Tredegar.21
Tredegar contributed to the rebuilding of Virginia, but some critics, particularly
outside the South, had their doubts about its independent role in reconstructing the South.
Those doubts originated from the perceived limited potential of the southern economy
after the war. Investing in southern enterprises appearedrisky,as the managers of the
Dover Company as discussed earlier. Tredegar represented a conundrum - for it was a
valid business opportunity, but itriskedinvesting money in an area lacking economic
stability. An 1866 letterfromAssistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus V. Fox
illustrated this dilemma.22
Fox requested information about Tredegar, knowing that "they have the best iron
to make guns," but expressed uncertainty if the workers had "the skill to commence that
work." Fox discussed his desire to leave his current position for a better opportunity
elsewhere, and sought to determine if Tredegar would offer him that chance. Tredegar
evidently was known to many associated with the iron industry, but a significant number
of people did not know the viability of such an enterprise in the postwar era. Fox
questioned "whether it is a good investment to build up." It seems that Fox did not want
21
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the Navy to test the stability of Tredegar, for his letter mentioned that, "the Navy requires
very few guns at present, but the Army [is] steadily at work." But Fox eventually
changed his mind. He asked Admiral John Dahlgren for his opinion of Tredegar, and
thus, Fox wrote a letter to Anderson that same day:
".. .since writing you this morning, I have seen Admiral Dahlgren who tells me
that the Tredegar Works, and the iron mines with them are in his opinion the most
valuable of any similar ones in the country.. ."23
While Admiral Dahlgren did not represent the general consensus of opinions on
Tredegar, particularly with Edwin Stanton's disdain for Anderson, he offered a counter
opinion to those businessmen and federal officials wary of investing in an unstable
southern economy. Tredegar already had an established reputation with the United States
Navy Department from before the war, and that business relationship may have
influenced Dahlgren's perspective, despite the horrific fate his son, Ulrich, suffered at the
hands of Richmonders. Those familiar with the iron industry (Dahlgren invented a type
of naval gun) more readily understood the importance of Tredegar to the common
defense. While Tredegar produced little in the way of ordnance, the Navy Department
and the War Department set up contracts for other iron products, including hardware and
iron plating.24
Although Tredegar's sales represented one of the best indicators of its postwar
success, so too did the success of its customers. Anderson wrote to the Virginia Central
Rail Road Company on July 30,1867, sending his regrets in not being able to attend the
celebration being held for the "completion of the Virginia Central Rail Road to its
western terminal." He begged forgiveness for his absence, stating that he "shall be with

LetterfromFox 16 April 1866, General Letterbook, 1864-66.
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[them] in spirit," and sent additional sentiments to the company. His recognition of this
"important event" demonstrated the unity of Tredegar and the railroad in rebuilding
Virginia's shattered economy. Anderson commented that the event "cannot be more
gratifying to any citizen other than myself, who have been its friend, whether in private
life or in the performance of the city."
This version of Tredegar's reputation differed from the perceptions held by the
company's laborers. During the war, Anderson had begun to rely heavily upon slave
labor to supplement the decreasing number of white workers. By the end of the war,
slavesfilledat least half the skilled and unskilled positions at the iron works. Anderson
saw the advantage of slave labor - namely that it was cheaper, and he could use slaves for
jobs that whites refused to do, mostly common laborers, teamsters, and mill hands.
Tredegar competed for slave labor though, particularly as the war came to a close, and
the military needed slaves to perform physical labor, including digging fortifications and
setting up city defenses. However, it was the white labor that he could not hold, as many
went into the service or fled the city. Anderson lost about half of his labor force - by
1864, he had less than 500 workers, and had started the war with 1,000. By the end of
the war, over half of those workers were black. Many of these black workers were also
drafted for short periods of time to work for the Confederate army, and Anderson's
protests against this fell on deaf ears. The black workers were returned after a period of a
few months, keeping the company operational. This reliance on slave labor helped
prepare Anderson for the labor struggles in the postwar period.26
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Anderson readily incorporated African American labor after the war, since he had
a precedent for employing white and black workers side by side, even though his workers
tended to segregate socially. Anderson did not immediately address the racial tension
caused by emancipation. He treated his skilled workers decently, both black and white,
so as to ensure stable production, offering competitive wages and not pressing charges
against strikers.
The white workers at Tredegar held different opinionsfromthat of their
employer. Racial tensions among the workers became exacerbated after the war.28
Before the war, slaves generally held unskilled positions at Tredegar. During the war,
out of necessity, they learned skilled jobs, as fewer white workers became available to
perform them. Working at Tredegar restricted their social lives, but they still managed to
form close and lasting ties within their community. The lure of jobs at one of
Richmond's industries, iron and tobacco being the most prominent, offered opportunities
for freed blacks, and by the end of the war, the number within the city had doubled, going
from 250 to over 500 in 1865.29
The use of former slaves as part of Tredegar's labor force contributed to the
success and ability of the company to get back on its feet in the postwar period; however,
it created insoluble discipline problems on the factory floor. Northern white workers
came to Tredegar, seeking the opportunity for employment at an all-white factory, but
were disappointed. The presence of black workers prevented many northern workers
from seeking employment at Tredegar, as they refused to work alongside "colored men."
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The transition from war to reconstruction, while occurring faster than in other areas, did
not go over smoothly in the immediate postwar period.
The strike of 1866 represented the racial tensions experienced at Tredegar.
Workers recruited from Philadelphia refused to start their contracted work because of the
black presence. Anderson perhaps sympathized with these white workers, for he viewed
black people as social inferiors, but because of his constant desire to turn a profit, he
treated workers based on skill level, not race. Work was integrated on the factory floor,
with blacks and whites intermixing each day. Eventually the white strike ended, with
Anderson refusing to hire the northern men, enraging his superintendent Henry McCarty,
who told Anderson he disliked the decision because McCarty favored the northern
workers. Anderson did not accede to any of the demands, and offered McCarty a choice
of leaving with a month's pay or a dismissal, ensuring that his managers would remember
•5 1

their place.
Black workers at Tredegar struck as well. The Liberator reported another strike
at Tredegar, where African American workers demanded higher wages, and were
attacked by white workers for their temerity at making those demands. Both races felt
persecuted, but in reality, black and white workers received comparable wages at
Tredegar, the differences being between skilled and unskilled jobs. In both strikes,
Anderson did not accede to any of the demands. He threatened to replace the recalcitrant
workers, but did not bring charges against them.

Anderson had no tolerance for those

who disagreed with his labor policies, as these two incidents showed.
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Strikes became more prevalent at Tredegar in the 1870s, with the labor struggle
becoming a triangular conflict between management, black labor, and white labor all
contending for power. Complicating this, black industrial workers celebrated the
anniversary of the occupation of the Union troops, alienating the southern white workers,
but making inroads to the northern white workers. Despite these conflicts, black workers
remained at Tredegar. The company provided them with steady jobs and a minimum of
$2.50 per day for skilled workers - a strong incentive in a war ravaged economy.33
By 1866, other southern cities began to recognize the resilience of Tredegar.
They turned to Tredegar to help in their own rebuilding process. Atlanta, seeking to
install a waterworks to the city, sought the costfromTredegar for production, transport
and labor costs to produce all the materials.34 The city of Richmond also recruited
Tredegar to aid in its rebuilding. A few years later, Tredegar's reputation continued to
"flourish," as described in the periodical Every Saturday. The author mentioned the large
number of orders and the amount in each, stating that "they need to be kept in operation
day and night to supply the orders which [were] pouring in from all sections of the
country." The publication claimed that Tredegar was the foremost producer of coal
freight cars in the country, stating that the company had just received an order for 1,500
cars for six raihoad companies.35
A report in the Boston Daily Journal suggested that Tredegar had "a worldwide
reputation," contributing to its success. The author remarked on the "devastating
success" of Richmond, which was accounted for through the presence of "Yankee
energy, German industry, and Scotch thrift." The enemy, the article suggested, was not
33
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the industrialists or the former Confederate soldiers - rather it was former "dealers in
humanity" who posed the threat to the future of the country and the reconstruction of the
South, as former slave traders did not possess a marketable skill. A reporter for a Boston
newspaper traveled to Richmond to write a piece on its postwar state, giving a brief
history of the city. As he moved into the present, he explained that Richmond "was not
as it was ante bellum [sic]." He discussed the success of industry in the city, and then
spoke of a darker history: the slave trade. He commented that all "gallant and brave
men" of the Confederate army were willing to repent, and it was slave traders who were
the obstacles to reconstruction. The words offered respect for Tredegar and other
industries of Richmond, exhibiting a relatively good opinion of Tredegar held by some
reporters in the North.
The recurrence of Tredegar advertisements demonstrated its prominence and its
financial status. Advertisements for the company appeared in northern and southern
newspapers, such as the Railway Times, the New York Herald, the Boston Daily Journal,
and the Baltimore Sun. The placements of the advertisements attest to Tredegar's
financial stability. They reappeared in these papers on the average of twice a month
during the 1860s and 1870s, showing that the company could well afford to advertise
heavily and often. On average, to run eight lines for one month in 1866, cost between
four and twelve dollars. The rates increased if more lines were used, and if the
advertisement extended beyond one month. One of the more generic advertisements for
the company, appearing in several newspapers, advertised Tredegar's continuing
production of railroad materials and iron products for ships. EnginesfromTredegar

"Waifs from Virginia," Boston Daily Journal, 18 May 1867.

became an important commodity for the company, and were therefore prominent in the
advertisements.
Other newspapers, such as the Baltimore Sun, posted shorter advertisements for
materials recently acquired from Tredegar which were for sale in local communities, or
from the company itself. E. Pratt and Brother advertised that they were "constantly
receiving a supply of 'Tredegar Iron Works' superior brand." These advertisements
represented Tredegar as a company not just supplying companies and firms directly for
projects, but the industry also acted as the supplier to smaller businesses which sold iron
products, but did not produce them. In the San Francisco Bulletin, Piatt and Newton, of
William T. Coleman and Company, advertised the availability of alcohol, candles, oil,
sugar, nails, and other various items, listing the origin of each. The nails listed came
from Tredegar Iron Works - illustrating the expansion of Anderson's company into the
West.38
Even as Tredegar aided in Richmond's reconstruction, the city remained strongly
traditional in its socioeconomic capacity. Tredegar continued to do well throughout
Reconstruction, but Richmond did not become a bustling metropolis. Anderson worked
with northerners, but he did not represent the majority of the population. He had an
integrated factory floor, but this did not equate to white Richmonders readily accepting
blacks as equal counterparts. In addition to the economic constraints on postwar
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Richmond, the city continued to face its personal dilemma of becoming a major
American city and yet avoiding the appearance of one.39
Becoming acclimated to the North and its presence required the recognition by
both Richmond's industry and its people of northern businesses and federal officials. In a
report of General Grant's visit to Richmond in 1866, the New York Herald reported that
Grant had a "gratifying" visit to the city, where large groups of people "flocked to see
him in large numbers." While there, several men of importance paid Grant courtesy
calls, Anderson among them.

Grant stayed in a luxurious room at the Spotswood Hotel,

Richmond's most prestigious hotel. The visit became a public relations act through
which Richmonders could showcase their progress since the Confederate defeat, putting
on a display the happenings of postwar industry. The "becoming feelings and
sentiments" contributed to this display, as if to suggest these citizens of Richmond
accepted defeat graciously. Given the lengthy struggles of Jim Crow still ahead, the
sentiments rang hollow, but Tredegar shined forth as a symbol of progress of which
Richmonders could be proud.
Even though Tredegar survived the war, and began producing soon after its end,
the industry did not become one of the country's major producers of iron products. It
regained a solid reputation with the Federal government and northern businesses, and
eventually, a solid base of capital and raw materials, resulting from northern investments.
The fact that Tredegar survived the war when so many other southern iron industries
declined illustrated the potential of both Anderson and Tredegar.
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Tredegar survived the war and continued into the postwar period, largely through
the accomplishments of Anderson. He ensured that Tredegar was not physically
damaged by the war. His ability to reestablish prewar contracts and creditors after the
war helped the company to recuperate at a quicker pace than industries in other southern
cities. In addition to adapting the company to the shaky environment, Anderson adapted
the labor force to the postwar world, employing black workers in about half of the skilled
positions after the war. With experienced labor and a capable company, Anderson and
Tredegar made the most out of Reconstruction. His business savvy and ability to adapt to
the changing political and economic climates both before and after the war made
Tredegar, and hence Richmond, distinctfromthe rest of the South. Anderson and his
company however were on the verge of a major shift in the industry.
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CHAPTER IV
RACE, RECONSTRUCTION, AND ECONOMIC PANIC

As the 1870s progressed, and Reconstruction began to wane, Tredegar continued
to produce, but the Panic of 1873 hit the company hard. Anderson's company suffered
tremendously through 1877, and on a national level, the iron industry never fully
rebounded. At the outset of the 1880s, steel gradually became the preference of railroads
and the government. Anderson recognized this shift, and attempted to alter Tredegar to
meet this market. The transition was too little, too late. Anderson lacked the necessary
capital to shift his large company from iron to steel, which required large and expensive
machinery. The Tredegar owner had plenty of raw materials and capital investment for
iron, but not the amount necessary to transitionfroma labor-intensive product to a more
capital-intensive one. The economic situation of the 1870s prevented Tredegar from
achieving enough success to maintain its status into the next century. After the initial
postwar success of the late 1860s, Tredegar began to decline in importance because its
owner no longer felt compelled to make the political and economic changes necessary for
the company's success.
Anderson used national politics to regain control of the company and maintain
support in Richmond by appealing directly to the Federal government for contracts.
Investments allowed Tredegar to endure economic panics, more so than other budding
industries. Even with these investments and the resulting sales, Anderson remained
grounded in the Democratic Party, steering away from Republicans and Readjusters, even
though both supported business to some extent. His resistance in the 1870s to shifting his
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political allegiances demonstrates the changes in Anderson's outlook for his company.
He remained dedicated to Tredegar's success, but was less willing to compromise his
political stance and his method of production.
The figures throughout this paper support the relative stability and gradual growth
of Tredegar. The chart below measures the success of Tredegar based on profit. It does
not include the effects of socioeconomic issues, nor does it illustrate the rising labor
problems through the 1860s. However, examining the sales of Tredegar during these
years proves the production capability and the consistent demand for the company's
goods.

Figure 3. Total Annual Sales at Tredegar, 1856-83.
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The sales books did not provide enough information for 1868, thus they are missing in
the chart, but the growing numbers suggest that the postwar period was one of
development. The noticeable dip in 1858 resultedfromthe Panic of 1857, when sales
dropped off significantly, but Tredegar did not go under. The reason for the spike in
1864 had less to do with sales, and was more the result of inflation in the Confederacy.
The effects of the Panic of 1873 can be seen from 1873 through 1879. Finally in the
1880s, business at Tredegar started to rebound, but once again started to fall in 1883, as
steel's dominance trumped iron.1
The success of Tredegar spurred other iron industries, for now Virginians realized
that modernization must accompany reconstruction. Thefigurebelow compares how
Virginia fared among the other southern states. Out of the country's largest iron
producers in 1880, Virginia ranked 15th, with 55,000 tons of iron. In comparison,
Pennsylvania ranked first, producing over three million tons.

1
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Figure 4. Value of Iron Products in Dollars, 1870-1880.

• Product Values, 1870

« Product Values, 1880

Source: Data was retrievedfromthe 1870 and 1880 Census reports, using thefiguresfromall iron related
products.

This data illustrates the differences in the value of iron products in the former
Confederate states. Some of the states did not have any reported iron products in 1880,
suggesting their manufacturing shifted to other products, such as textiles. This further
illustrates that while industrialization expanded during Reconstruction on a national level,
it also occurred unevenly. The immediate postwar success of Tredegar further
demonstrates that even with the destruction of southern industry during the Civil War,
one iron industry remained and became prosperous again fairly quickly.2
In the 1870s, Tredegar had to meet an entirely different set of standards from
those of the prewar period. Rather than dominating southern industry, the company's
2
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regionally-based reputation had to compete on a national scale. More iron and steel
industries appeared, and while Tredegar was the largest iron industry in the South, it no
longer held the distinction of the being one of the most efficient in the country. Also,
Tredegar's success became irreversibly connected to the fate of Richmond, and that city
took a decade to recover from the effects of the Panic of 1873.4
As a result of the Panic of 1873, output declined, and Tredegar customers failed to
pay their bills. In 1876, Tredegar was forced to shut down production temporarily,
resultingfromthe "continued depression of the iron trade." This stunted Tredegar's
output and profit levels in the second half of the decade, particularly as Anderson could
not afford to make the transition from iron to steel. Tredegar had a strong foundation and
an intelligent owner, but it remained at the mercy of the national iron industry. The
company failed to enjoy a reputation the likes of which it possessed before the panic.
Even with the investments Anderson had acquired after the war, the economic depression
affected Tredegar severely, resulting in a lower output and a tenuous place in the national
industry, even with Anderson's place in the city government.5
The failure to deepen the James River near Richmond or expand the Kanawha
Canal lessened the importance of Richmond in an age more and more dependent upon
steamships. Constantfloodingin the canal prevented itfromrunning efficiently, and
thus, did not achieve the success Richmonders had desired. In 1877, Anderson, still
involved in the running of the city, proposed that instead of a canal, the city build a
railroad following the same path of the intended canal into Ohio - an idea from earlier in
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the decade among those not in favor of the canal project. He met significant objections
from city leaders and stock holders in the canal company. Some Virginia citizens also
objected to the raihoad, preferring to have a canal, fearing the adverse effects that
railroads might have on their farms. Even though Tredegar had proven that railroads not canals - were the wave of the future, Richmonders' technological conservatism
prevented themfromreaping the benefits of Anderson's iron industry.6
Still, iron manufacturing was more important in Virginia than it had ever been.
Several thousand were employed in iron companies throughout the state, Tredegar
remaining Richmond's largest employer. As of 1870, Tredegar alone employed
approximately one thousand workers. The majority of workers at Tredegar were mostly
native-born Americans which suggests that the company was not as dependent on
immigrant labor since more native born workers, both black and white, were acquiring
skilled positions in the factory. In the same census, Richmond reported approximately
18,000 workers in its labor force, with manufacturing consisting of just under a third of
that labor force.7
With the increasing industry in the urban South, labor unions became more
prevalent. According to C. Vann Woodward, unions were not all the same throughout
the South. Some unions had strict racial distinctions (such as raihoad companies), while
others incorporated both races (such as carpenters). The Knights of Labor gradually
became a dominant labor union throughout the South. One of its first southern branches
was created in Richmond, though it remained a small force there in the 1880s. Tredegar
consisted of both types of unions, and black and white unions even reached across the
6
7
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racial divide, uniting against employers. Even though unions existed at Tredegar, the
Knights never became a dominant force there because labor unions generally did not
experience tremendous success in achieving their goals with Anderson in charge.8
Tredegar did not feel the full effects of unions and strikes, as the lack of
association among white and black workers did not exist outside the workplace. Efforts
to integrate races in Richmond resulted in the development of a separate black
community within Richmond during the 1870s.9 At Tredegar, at least three sections of
the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers existed, and one was for black
workers only. During the 1880s, the black lodge of the Association "extended mutual
support to their white union brothers." Black unions as a result fought even more to
acquire equality through their support of white unions at Tredegar. Since unionism and
strikes did not affect the production of Tredegar significantly, labor struggles did not
present an impediment to Tredegar's sales.10
City politics during this decade also affected Anderson, and consequently
Tredegar. By 1870, conservatism had once again become prominent in Richmond
politics, but was tempered by Readjuster and Republican forces in the city. Anderson
remained a staunch Democrat during these political controversies. In October 1873, in
anticipation of the November elections, a New York newspaper discussed the state of
Virginia, lending importance to these elections in particular because Virginians wanted to
avoid the "unfortunate condition" of states farther South where Republicans occupied the
8
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government. Democrats regained some of their power during the middle of the 1870s,
and dominated Richmond politics by the mid 1880s.11
Richmond's political environment grew increasingly complex during the 1870s.
The city council remained segregated during the 1870s through the creation of the sixth
ward in Richmond. Richmond was divided intofivevoting wards, but to minimize the
influence of the black voters, the Conservative city council created the sixth ward to
contain the entire black community of Richmond, thereby leaving the otherfivewards to
white domination. This gave the council considerable leverage over the black population
in the city. As a result of the devastating effects of the 1873 Panic, people lost faith in
the Conservative government, so determined to repay the state debt and earn a stellar
reputation for Virginia. These Conservatives, known as Funders, sought to relieve
Virginia's debt through taxes. However, this procedure led to widespread discontent
among voters in Richmond, leading to the development of the Readjusters, who
advocated lessfiscalconservatism and the repayment of debt through legislation, not
taxes. William Mahone, leader of the Readjusters and failed raihoad owner, stated that
the social cost was far too high in the Funders attempt to repay Virginia's debt.12
Anderson, along with many southerners, remained conservative throughout this
decade. While the Readjuster platform mentioned business, Anderson remained a
staunch Democrat, strongly disagreeing with the political integration of the Readjusters.
This sentiment added to the already present antipathy Anderson felt towards Readjusters
for being anti-northern capital and business. The Tredegar owner very much supported
northern capital because little existed in the South. Anderson depended on the capital
u
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investments of the North, and also the business contracts with northern businesses during
Reconstruction. Previously, the Tredegar owner sacrificed all for the betterment of his
iron business, but his proclivity to shift his political allegiance waned. He proved his
willingness to approach the Federal government for contracts, but no longer were those
contracts the most important source of revenue for Tredegar, clearfromhis contracts with
northern businesses. The company's sales showed more business with local enterprises
and private companies, seeking to avoid a large role in the public sector. The increasing
demand among local businesses in order to rebuild Virginia combined with the political
support the owners offered provided the means through which Tredegar existed with
Democratic support.1
By 1879, the Readjusters acquired federal positions of power, and by 1881, they
occupied Virginia's governorship through their candidate, William Cameron. The
Readjusters already cultivated an alliance with Republicans in the 1870s to combat the
strength of the Democratic Party, and so acquired the support of Republicans and
Republican voters. The Readjuster platform therefore sought to appease both the poorer
classes, and the black voters, and advocated a smaller tax on farmers. Although they
raised taxes for raihoads and corporations in the hopes of negating the northern influence,
they also sought protective tariffs for manufacturing in Richmond - an attempt to appeal
to Richmond's industrialists.14
Readjusters supported black voters though, a position the prejudiced and
conservative Anderson, among other southerners, could not accept. Even though the
Democratic Party did not expressly support business, they did call for limited African
13
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American participation in society and politics. Anderson had no qualms in using black
workers to make a profit, but certainly did not view them as equals in politics or society.
The efforts to change the world around him caused Anderson to dig in his heels. Before
the war, he easily put business before politics, but in the aftermath, he grew increasingly
stubborn, and unwilling to adapt to changes in politics which he refused to accept, as no
other Party option existed which would coalesce with his views.1
During the streak of Readjustment power, blacks gained a few local offices. Two
blacks sat on the School Board in Richmond by 1883, in addition to the displacement by
blacks of a quarter of the city's white teacher positions. Democrats in Richmond
watched the reforms of the Readjusters in horror, waiting for the opportunity to reassert
their control of the local government. By the mid 1880s, the Danville race riot left
Virginians shaken, and offered Richmond Democrats the ammunition to put the
Readjuster government to death. Democrats used the "Negro domination," the
incorporation of blacks, which the Readjusters supported, against them, using the violent
Danville riot, which resulted in the deaths of whites and blacks, as a scare tactic.16
Richmond Democrats achieved the desired result. The Readjusters lost their base
of support, many fleeing back to the Democrats, others to the Republicans, for fear of a
black dominated government. Although the first Jim Crow law was not instituted in
Virginia until 1900, segregation remained much a part of the city's dynamic. The level
of integration among workers at Tredegar therefore represented an anomaly, especially
with Anderson on the city council. The Tredegar owner had definitive views on the
inferiority of blacks and their role in politics, and supported segregation outside the
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workplace, but within his factory, the business and need for competitiveness meant using
whichever labor would increase sales and thus profits. In Anderson's mind, segregation
had no place on the floor at Tredegar, even though it could infest city life.
Richmond Democrats rewarded Anderson for his steadfast loyalty. Although they
sought to lessen the effects of the previous Reconstruction governments, they tended to
favor raihoads and manufacturers operated by local Party heads. Although far more probusiness, Republicans included blacks, northern whites, and southern whites who did not
support the Confederacy. To Anderson, these sectors of political society represented the
antithesis of his political affiliations. The failure of Republicans to follow through on
promises to expand industry to appease an industrialist such as Anderson further
solidified Anderson's support of Richmond's Democratic Party. Democrats considered
the Republican Party so "unsouthern" that Anderson believed his business would lose
1 Si

support of locals if he aligned with them.
What truly kept Andersonfromjoining the Republican Party were the radicals.
Anderson had the support of many northern Conservative Republicans (for example,
William Aspinwall), who sought an easy truce with the South, with an emphasis on
rebuilding the economy (as noted in the dealings with Dover in New York). Little
evidence suggests that Anderson in any way supported the Readjusters. While they
supported the institution of protective tariffs for industry, they also advocated industrial
workers' rights and the cessation of northern capital in the South. Anderson and his son,
Archer, who took over Tredegar, lobbied hard to remove the Readjusters from politics.
In 1885, a New York newspaper reported that Anderson's son was on a committee to
17
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offer the newly-elected Grover Cleveland some advice in returning previously held
Readjuster seats to the Democrats in Congress. Anderson continued to use politics as a
means of business support.19
In the 1870s and 1880s, Anderson represented something of an enigma, for he
represented the industrial drive of the New South, but not its modernizing mentality.
Oft

Most importantly, he could not make the transition to steel.

Wrought iron and steel

were produced simultaneously, and they vied for the same market during the late 19th
century. Iron was more labor intensive - requiring a puddler and an assistant to refine it,
and try as they might, puddlers could not shorten the time consuming process. Steel
required more capital - meaning a Bessemer converter - but it allowed for faster
production and resulted in a product as strong, if not stronger, than iron. Fewer laborers
were needed to oversee this process. Thus, the labor costs of iron exceeded that of steel.
Steel required fewer inputs (coal, for instance) than iron, so for many companies the
change to steel was inevitable. However, steel required a tremendous amount of
investment capital to begin. One newspaper believed that a company needed
approximately $300,000 to transition completely to Bessemer converters to produce
steel.21
Anderson could not make this transition. To convert to steel, he would have had
to remove much of his labor force and his reliance on coal. He had contracts set up with
surrounding coal mines, such as Tuckahoe and his brother's mine, Cloverdale. While his
19
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contracts provided access to raw materials (coal, iron ore), he did not gain enough capital
to transition his large company to steel manufacture. Had Tredegar been smaller, he
might have made the change, buttiansformingso large a company required more
monetary reserves than he had available. The desire to convert to steel existed, as evident
when the New York Herald reported that Tredegar had been in the running to gain
contracts to cast steel guns for the Federal government. Had Anderson succeeded and
'yy

gained a cash advance, he would have had the capital necessary to produce steel.
Anderson's failure to transition the company to steel products resulted in
Tredegar's decline, but Anderson realized his error more than a decade after the Panic of
1873 had savaged his industry. On a trip to Wheeling, a reporter for the Wheeling
Register interviewed Anderson and his sons, asking after the industry in Richmond.
Anderson replied that it was "very dull indeed," elaborating that he and his sons were
"visiting the manufacturing centers of the country.. .to study the progress of the times."
He expressed optimism about the market for iron though, stating that "good times are
always ahead of bad times," and it would be "a mere matter of time" before the industry
revived. Anderson had long shown a willingness to adapt, but in the 1870s, this trait
abandoned him. His conservative approach to new technology, demonstrated by his
lukewarm support of steel, caused his industry to drop in importance.23
Still, Tredegar fit in with the increasing industrialization of the South.
Economically, the company served as a mouthpiece for the "New South." Ideologically
though, Tredegar did offer up a successful business model. Both the company and city of
Richmond used similar strategies to regroup and recover after the war. Each reached
22
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back to previous traditional heritages, and used them to impose stable and strong
environments, beckoning reconstruction and credit. Richmond reached back to its
Revolutionary reputation to validate its role in the future. Once the veil of
Reconstruction had been lifted, Richmond realized it still had much to rebuild and create
to catch up to the rest of the country. The capitol became what Chesson referred to as
"the old city of the New South."24 This concept supports the evidence that Richmond
remained unsure of its place in the post-Reconstruction world. For all it had done to
advance iron manufacture in the antebellum period, its delay in modernizing left it far
behind the rest of the South. Tredegar, it seems, suffered from the same outlook as the
city.
The production from Tredegar contributed to the role Richmond played as a part
of the New South, although the city maintained a traditional mindset until around the
1890s, when a new concept arose - that of the Lost Cause. Also increasing in prevalence
were Jim Crow laws. The former affected the general mindset, but the latter shaped labor
and politics. The first Jim Crow edict did not appear until the turn of the century, but the
influence of segregation had been present in Richmond since the 1870s. Even though the
Republican Party attempted to establish itself in the South and in Richmond, its members
faced the combined front of Readjusters and Democrats. After the Readjusters went
under, Richmond's Republicans followed, and the city remained conservative into the
1890s.25
The leadership of Tredegar changed in 1892 with the passing of Anderson that
year, shifting ownership to his son Archer. Politics in Richmond remained Democratic,
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especially as segregation became a stricter part of the law. Segregation also affected the
relationship between white and black unions which had developed during the 1880s.
Tredegar continued to produce, but without steel production, the company gradually
declined in importance. Anderson remained a conservative for the rest of his life,
exhibiting the resistance to Republican politics common in most southerners during
Reconstruction.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

Tredegar did not experience the same success as the industries in the North.
Anderson never reached the ranks of men like Carnegie or Rockefeller. He did not
embrace technological progress enough, even though he often compromised his political
views. Anderson's ability to adapt was limited in much the same way Richmond's
progress was stunted. The city of Richmond remained what Chesson referred to as a
"miniature metropolis," never achieving the potential witnessed in other cities.1
Richmond was unique though. For years before the war, it contained an iron factory that
utilized slave labor - a rarity in the country because southerners routinely believed that
slavery and industry did not mesh well. Antebellum factories developed through the use
of cheap - butfree- labor, so the incorporation of slave labor at Tredegar was a singular
occurrence.
From his appearance at Tredegar in 1842 through the Civil War, Anderson's
business model was unique to the South. Few other southerners had the motivation to
enter the iron industry over tobacco, cotton, or sugar. Richmond's environment and the
railroad boom in Virginia during the 1830s contributed to Tredegar's success, but it was
the industry's eventual owner who would lead the company to enjoy success for several
decades. Through political alliances, Anderson kept a steady supply of business relations
and raw materials. His ability to put his businessfirstresulted in his quick shifts in
political affiliations, but he achieved an iron industry with consistent political support.
1
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He was able to recognize when he needed to shift from the Whigs to the Democrats, and
this ensured Tredegar's success.2
Tredegar demonstrated success when examined within the context of the South.
The company went through economic crises, shifting political allegiances, war, labor
problems, and reconstruction. Tredegar demonstrated the expanding, yet uneven,
industrialism experienced by the country. The financial panics throughout the nineteenth
century all hit Tredegar hard, but Anderson's skill at retaining capital and maintaining
production in times of crisis allowed the company to survive. The 1837 Panic hit during
a major railroad boom in Virginia, right when Tredegar had formed and began producing
to meet that market. After several attempts to save the foundering company, Tredegar's
Board turned to Anderson, who managed to pull the company back from financial ruin.
Tredegar hit another economic snag in 1857, when many of its customers defaulted on
payments, forcing Anderson to beg the banks for loans just to let the company survive.
The politics affecting Tredegar followed a similar pattern of ups and downs. Initially,
Anderson was a member of the Whig Party, which supported industry, tariffs, and
internal improvements. When the Party began to crumble, Anderson left to join the
Democratic Party in hopes of creating a solid foundation by convincing Democrats to
support Tredegar since he utilized slave labor.
During the first half of the 1860s, the company had to switch its focus to wartime
production as orders from Confederate states and the Confederate government poured in.
This was a tremendous opportunity for expansion, but access to raw materials decreased
by 1861, and prevented Tredegar from operating at its prewar capacity. Nevertheless,

2
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Tredegar ended the war mostly unscathed, able to begin production a few months after
Union occupation. Since Anderson had posted men to protect his company, Tredegar
survived the destructive Confederate retreat. Anderson's skill as a businessman and a
politician came into play at the war's end, when, true to his chameleon-like political
practices, he immediately declared loyalty to the Union.4
The immediate postwar phase saw a quick recovery by Tredegar. Limited
production began in 1865, and Anderson had regained full ownership by 1867. His quick
abandonment of the Confederacy gave Anderson the ability to regain full control of the
company, further emphasizing his dedication to the business. With the support of
Virginia's Governor Pierpont, President Johnson granted Anderson's pardon, and within
a few years, he had regained full ownership of Tredegar (he only had regained partial
ownership in 1865). He remained in politics, as a member of the city council,
determining how best to influence the city government in a way which would benefit his
company. The Tredegar owner was able to reestablish his business's prewar contracts,
allowing sales to steadily rise as the next decade approached.5
As Reconstruction continued into the 1870s, Anderson used the opportunity to
promote Tredegar using its prewar reputation for products and to regain the contracts of
the Federal government. Many northern businesses were wary about investing in the
South, but several still recognized the vitality of the company, including Admiral
Dahlgren, who had every reason to express hatred toward the city which had treated his
son's corpse so callously during the war. Even though he had been producing the
weapons for the Confederate effort, Anderson managed to regain the business
4
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associations he once had, due mostly in part to his character and ambition. Once
Anderson gained enough investment, he was able to expand Tredegar in an attempt to
increase production, most of which went to railroads and rebuilding the South.
Tredegar'sfinancialstate improved as profits increased, though not rapidly. The
devastating condition of Richmond and the southern economy after the war kept the
success of Tredegar in check.6
So too did the increased worker tensions in the aftermath of the war. Workers at
Tredegar varied in race, with no specific race dominating over another. Blacks and
whites held skilled positions. Blacks gained skilled jobs during the war, when southern
white workers were sparse, creating insoluble racial tensions when white workers
returned. Northern and immigrant laborers also caused problems, as many of them
refused to work in an environment with the slightest hint of integration. Most notable
were the Philadelphia workers, hired for Tredegar, who refused to take their positions
because they did not want to work alongside black employees. Other strikes at the
company involved demands for better treatment and higher wages, particularly as the era
of labor unionism became more prominent in industries after the war.7
The Panic of 1873 was the heaviest burden on Tredegar, particularly since it came
when Tredegar and the rest of the South was trying to recoverfromthe war. Production
and profits declined; but again, Tredegar weathered the storm. Through Anderson's
acquisition of investments during the previous two decades, Tredegar survived, but he
never fully restored Tredegar to its prewar glory. Anderson was forced to shut down
production briefly, and lay off over half of his labor force. The depression ruined
6
7
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Anderson's chances for continuing the importance of Tredegar into the 1880s. The 1870s
left Anderson embittered toward Republicans and strengthened his ties to the Democratic
Party.8
During this period, the Readjusters altered the political landscape of Richmond,
increasing the placement of blacks in Richmond. The black community gained more
participation in politics, although the effects of their run in politics did not last.
Democrats regained the political majority in the city, ensuring that Anderson would
remain a member of the party, since his interests coalesced with their platform. Even
though both Readjusters and Republicans supported business, Anderson no longer
compromised his political views to gain their support. Rather, he cultivated alliances
through business, gaining Democratic supportfromthe owners of the companies with
whom he dealt and through his influence on Richmond's city council, which he had been
serving since before the war.9
When iron shifted to steel, Tredegar could not shift its production, causing
Richmond to lose the status of the South's main industrial center. Tredegar, too, began to
lose its prominence once steel became the order of the day. With the effects of the panic,
Tredegar lost any hope of gaining the necessary capital to make the transition. Anderson
made Tredegar distinct from the rest of the South before, during, and immediately after
the war, but it was not enough to survive the economic, labor, and modernizing changes
of the late 1870s and 1880s.10
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Anderson continued to lead the company in producing materials for railroads and
steamships through the 1880s and 1890s. He did not live to see the turn of the century
though. Anderson died in 1892, with his role falling to his son, Archer. His family
continued ensuring Tredegar's progress into the 1950s. Tredegar's reputation for quality
provided an image of what could have been in the South, and established a legacy for
southern industry to follow in the next century.11
Building off of Eric Foner's assessment that Tredegar was the exception to the
failure of industrialization in South, this study illustrates why it was the exception.
Anderson's business savvy and his ability to adapt to changing economic and political
climates explains how Tredegar became such an important industry in the South. Little
incentive existed for southerners to drop agriculture and invest in industry, particularly as
agriculture never lost its allure. Entering into an industry was expensive and required not
only capital but access to raw materials. Few southerners shared Anderson's motivation
to achieve industrial success. The limited access to raw materials also deterred many
southernersfromperceiving an iron industry as a wise investment. With Anderson's
access to raw materials and his ability to gain contracts with northern businesses and the
Federal government gave him an edge lacking in the rest of the region.
One of the themes of Foner *s Reconstruction emphasized the transformation of
southern society during Reconstruction. Anderson maintained avid support for his
company through his political affiliations, allowing it to continue, and prosper. It also
demonstrated how unique Tredegar was among the rest of the South. During
Reconstruction, southern society underwent changes in how citizens dealt with one
11
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another, but Anderson had become accustomed to working with northern white
businessmen, helping him prepare for the environment after the war. Anderson had
already begun to transform his views of society, recognizing that doing so would give
him the advantage in making the changes of Reconstruction work for him. This ability to
transform his politics so efficiently and his willingness to integrate labor, despite his
racist mentality explains Tredegar's unique experience and illustrates the potential other
southern cities chose not to embrace.
Tredegar's story can only be explained through its owner for much of the
nineteenth century, Joseph Anderson. The first phasefromhis start at Tredegar through
1865 illustrated a businessman willing to sacrifice all to achieve success for his company.
He recognized the potential of Tredegar, being unique to the South, and set about
guaranteeing contracts with companies nationwide and the Federal government. When
the business-supporting Whig Party in Richmond failed, he shifted to the Democrats,
convincing them to offer support for Tredegar because of the company's use of slaves.
When war broke in 1861, Anderson broke ties with northern businesses and the Federal
government, seeing the opportunity that the Confederate war effort provided.
After the war, again he altered his convictions, declaring loyalty to the Federal
government, and reestablishing contracts with them and northern businesses, once more
putting business interests first. The Panic of 1873 changed Anderson's adaptive quality.
The depression forever ruined Tredegar's chance at national importance. Anderson
became less likely to change his politics. He remained loyal to the Democrats, which
also stagnated the physical growth of Tredegar. Without the support of Republicans,
Tredegar continued to produce, but did not gain the reputation or capital necessary to
13
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shift to steel. Anderson's opportunity to do so during the 1870s was ignored out of his
refusal to change, costing Tredegar a nationally successful future. The adaptation which
had served Anderson and Tredegar so well before and during the war eroded by the late
1870s and into the 1880s. Tredegar represented what could have been in the South
before the war, but its declining role by the end of Reconstruction slowly pushed it into
obscurity.
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